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Introduction
The legal capacity of the World Bank 1 to consider an applicant's
* J.D., Harvard Law School, 1998; A.B., Harvard College, 1995. This article was
written while the author was an Associate at the law firm of Davis Polk & Wardwell.
The author would like to thank Patricia Armstrong, the Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights, and Davis Polk & Wardwell for their support in this endeavor. The views
expressed herein are solely those of the author.
1. See THE WORLD BANK, ANNuAL REPORT 1997 x (1997). The "World Bank" con-
sists of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the
International Development Association (IDA). See id. For a helpful synopsis of the dis-
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human rights record when making its credit decisions has long been the
subject of vehement debate in the international community.2 As a preemi-
nent creditor to developing nations,3 the World Bank is in a position to
exercise considerable leverage over countries.4 In fiscal year 1999 alone,
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and
the International Development Association (IDA) collectively extended cap-
ital commitments amounting to US$29 billion,5 the overwhelming majority
of which went to developing states.6 Many of those borrowing states have
been accused of serious human rights violations in recent years.7 It is
tinct roles played by the IBRD and the IDA in the World Bank's affairs, see Mark E.
Wadrzyk, Is It Appropriate for the World Bank to Promote Democratic Standards in a Bor-
rower Country?, 17 Wis. INT'L LJ. 553, 556-57 (1999). In this article, the World Bank is
alternatively referred to as the "Bank." "Credit decisions" refer to decisions made by the
World Bank to approve or deny an IBRD loan or IDA credit to a potential borrower.
2. See generally Halim Moris, The World Bank and Human Rights: Indispensable Part-
nership or Mismatched Alliance?, 4 ILSAJ. Irr'L & CoMP. L. 173 (1997). Moris provides
an overview and discussion of numerous arguments made for and against World Bank
involvement in the human rights arena.
The World Bank's involvement in the human rights arena has received substantial
attention in the academic literature. Although a number of more recent publications are
cited herein, two of the most valuable analyses of the legality of human rights considera-
tions under the IBRD and IDA Articles of Agreement were written approximately two
decades ago. See generally Victoria E. Marmorstein, World Bank Power to Consider
Human Rights Factors in Loan Decisions, 13 J. INr'L L. & ECON. 113 (1978); Robert W.
Kneller, Human Rights, Politics, and the Multilateral Development Banks, 6 YALE STUD. IN
WORLD PUB. ORD. 361 (1980).
3. See LAwYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE WORLD BANK: GOVERNANCE AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 61 (2d ed. 1995). The World Bank is the single largest creditor to many
of the world's less developed nations. See id. Also it is the largest aggregate financial
provider for international development, devoting the bulk of its vast resources to that
endeavor. See Jonathan Cahn, Challenging the New Imperial Authority: The World Bank
and the Democratization of Development, 6 HAuv. HUM. RTs. J. 159, 162-63 (1993).
4. See, e.g., Anne Orford, Locating the International: Military and Monetary Interven-
tion After the Cold War, 38 HAv. INr'L LJ. 443, 464-71 (1997); John D. Ciorciari, A
Prospective Enlargement of the Roles of the Bretton Woods Financial Institutions in Interna-
tional Peace Operations, 22 FoRDHAm INT'L LJ. 292, 340-45 (1998) (describing and criti-
quing the use of conditionality programs to address a wide range of economic,
administrative, and arguably social policies).
5. See THE WORLD BANK, ANNUAL REPORT 1999 i (2000). That figure was a slight
increase over 1998, when the IBRD and IDA extended $21.0 billion and $7.5 billion in
capital commitments, respectively. See id.; THE WORLD BANK, ANNUAL REPORT 1998 88
(1999) [hereinafter WORLD BANK 1998 REPORT].
6. See generally WORLD BANK 1998 REPORT, supra note 5 (providing a full descrip-
tion of the World Bank's recent loans and credits, including a breakdown of commit-
ments by country recipient). With the approval of the Republic of Palau in 1998, the
IBRD's membership rose to 181, while the IDA had 160 members as of the same date.
See id. at 9.
7. See, e.g., Marmorstein, supra note 2, at 116. For many years, the World Bank has
provided development assistance to nations whose governments have been accused of
grave human rights violations. See id. Marmorstein noted that, as early as 1977, IBRD
loans and IDA credits were extended to at least 16 "generally recognized human rights
violators." Id., Table I, at 116.
The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights has also asserted that "[t]he list of coun-
tries receiving World Bank loans and/or credits in which the governments consistently
and systematically violate fundamental human rights is not short." LAwYERs COMMITTEE
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 37; see also Jerome I. Levinson, Repressive Regimes
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therefore clear that the World Bank's consideration of its borrowers'
human rights records when making credit decisions could profoundly
affect the Bank's relationship with nations throughout the developing
world.8
Since the dismantling of the Iron Curtain, the Bretton Woods institu-
tions,9 collectively the IBRD and the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
like other organs of the United Nations system, have realized enhanced
freedom of action, no longer encumbered by the bipolar geopolitical frame-
work of the Cold War.10 That increased freedom has enabled international
financial institutions, led by the World Bank, to promote the principles of
liberal democracy and free-market economics more vigorously than was
previously possible."' Cognizant of this change in geopolitical climate,
many scholars and international organizations have called upon the World
Bank to take a more proactive role in the human rights arena.
12
Several such proponents have cited the European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (EBRD) as an appropriate model for multilateral
Shouldn't Get a Loan, WASH. POST, June 15, 1998, at A23 ("ITIhe World Bank and IMF
have continued to provide financing to countries that engage in egregious abuses of
human rights.... ").
The World Bank's willingness to lend money to nations with poor human rights
records has brought the Bank under intense criticism, which has increased in recent
years. For an overview of the criticisms leveled at the Bank for its loans to oppressive
regimes, see generally Nicole Wendt, 50th Anniversary of the World Bank and the IMF
Prompts Criticisms, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149 (1999).
8. See Moris, supra note 2, at 184-97; Cahn, supra note 3, at 164. Proponents of
active World Bank intervention in the human rights arena and objectors to such involve-
ment agree that the Bank's financial clout places it in a position to exert tremendous
influence. See id.
9. See Dominique Carreau, Why Not Merge the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)?, 62 FORD-
Am L. REv. 1989, 1989 (1994). The Bretton Woods institutions were products of the
United Nations International Monetary and Financial Conference, held in Bretton
Woods, New Hampshire in 1944 [hereinafter the Bretton Woods Conference or Confer-
ence]. Both the IBRD and IMF are specialized agencies of the United Nations. For a
more extensive description of the World Bank and IMF and how they differ, see gener-
ally id.
10. See Orford, supra note 4, at 443;John W. Head, Supranational Law: How the Move
Toward Multilateral Solutions Is Changing the Character of "International" Law, 42 KAN. L.
REv. 605, 638 (1994); John Linarelli, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment and the Post-Cold War Era, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 373, 375 (1995).
11. See Orford, supra note 4, at 460, 464; John Stremlau & Francisco Sagasti,
Preventing Deadly Conflict: Does the World Bank Have a Role?, Report for the Carnegie
Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict 8-9 (1998), available at <http://
www.ccpdc.org/pubs/worldbank/world.html>.
12. See, e.g., LAwYERS COMMITEE FOR Hu'AN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 61-62; House
of Commons Canada, From Bretton Woods to Halifax and Beyond: Towards a 21st Summit
for the 21st Century Challenge, Report of the House of Commons Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs and International Trade on the Issues of International Financial Institu-
tions Reforms for the Agenda of the June 1995 G-7 Halifax Summit, available at <http://
vww.library.utoronto.ca/g7/governmental/hc25/> [hereinafter House of Commons
Canada report]. Numerous other advocates of increased World Bank consideration of
human rights records are cited in Moris, supra note 2.
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development banks in the post-Cold War era.13 The EBRD, created in
1990,14 has a specific political mandate to champion multiparty democ-
racy, respect for human rights, and free-market economic principles. 15
Some have proposed that the charters of the IBRD 16 and IDA 17 be
amended to include a similar mandate. 18 However, in view of the high
procedural barriers to amendment, 19 most who support the Bank's consid-
eration of borrowers' human rights records in making credit decisions sim-
ply have advocated a broader interpretation of the Bank's powers under its
13. See, e.g., Gfinther Handl, The Legal Mandate of Multilateral Development Banks as
Agents for Change Toward Sustainable Development, 92 AJ.I.L. 642, 645-46 (1998);
Linarelli, supra note 10, at 440.
14. See Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, May 29, 1990, 29 INT'L LEGAL MATErALs 1077, available at <http://
www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1991/15.html> (entered into force Mar. 28,
1991) [hereinafter Agreement Establishing the EBRD]; see also IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, THE
EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE
CONSTITUENT AGREEMENT 1 (1990); EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOP-
MENT, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT (1995).
15. See Agreement Establishing the EBRD, supra note 14, at 1083 ("The contracting
parties . .. fare] [c]ommitted to the fundamental principles of multiparty democracy,
the rule of law, respect for human rights and market economics."). For a broader discus-
sion of the differences between the EBRD and the IBRD, see SHIHATA, supra note 14, at
40-49.
16. See Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, opened for signature Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, 2 U.N.T.S. 134, as
amended Feb. 19, 1989, available at <http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/backgrd/
ibrd/arttoc.htm> [hereinafter IBRD Articles of Agreement or IBRD Charter] (stating that
the IBRD Articles of Agreement constitute its governing organizational charter).
17. See Articles of Agreement of the International Development Association, Jan. 26,
1960, 11 U.S.T. 2284, 439 U.N.T.S. 249, available at <http://www.worldbank.org/ida/
idaart.htm> [hereinafter IDA Articles of Agreement or IDA Charter] (stating that the
IDA, like the IBRD, is governed by its Articles of Agreement).
The IDA Articles of Agreement conform closely to the IBRD Articles of Agreement for
purposes of the present discussion. Therefore, this article will focus primarily on the
IBRD Articles of Agreement. See infra note 45.
18. See, e.g., Josephine Verspaget, Report on the Activities of the Bretton Woods Institu-
tions (World Bank and International Monetary Fund), Eur. Parl. Ass., Doc. No. 7256, at 2;
House of Commons Canada report, supra note 12; Jerome Levinson, Multilateral Financ-
ing Institutions: What Form of Accountability?, 8 Am. U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 47, 59 (1992).
19. See IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 16, art. VIII, § (a). The practical
obstacles to amending the IBRD or IDA Articles of Agreement are formidable. With
limited exceptions inapplicable to the present discussion, the process for amendment of
the IBRD Charter is as follows:
Any proposal to introduce modifications in this Agreement, whether emanating
from a member, a governor or the Executive Directors, shall be communicated to
the Chairman of the Board of Governors who shall bring the proposal before the
Board. If the proposed amendment is approved by the Board the Bank shall, by
circular letter or telegram, ask all members whether they accept the proposed
amendment. When three-fifths of the members, having eighty-five percent, of
the total voting power, have accepted the proposed amendments, the Bank shall
certify the fact by formal communication addressed to tall] members.
Id. The IDA Articles of Agreement include a similar provision for amendment. See IDA
Articles of Agreement, supra note 17, art. IX. The requirements that 60% of the Bank's
members and 85% of its voting power approve an amendment make any liberalization of
the Bank's political mandate highly unlikely because a majority of the Bank's member
nations are developing countries apt to oppose any such amendment.
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existing Articles of Agreement. 20
Exhortations that the World Bank weigh its applicants' human rights
records in making credit decisions have met with myriad arguments to the
contrary.21 Critics of World Bank intervention in the human rights arena
have rejected the EBRD analogy and contend that the Bretton Woods insti-
tutions already overstep their proper bounds in dictating legal and political
policies to less developed nations.22 Emerging countries themselves are
among the most outspoken objectors to a more aggressive IBRD human
rights agenda,23 holding that human rights criteria in the Bank's lending
practice would merely serve as another lever for neocolonial influence via
the organs of international finance. 24 Consequently, developing nations
have generally advocated a narrow interpretation of the Bank's powers
under the IBRD and IDA Articles of Agreement. 25
A. The World Bank's Position
The World Bank has never issued a publicly-available policy statement
regarding its power to apply human rights criteria to potential borrowers.
26
Nevertheless, throughout its history, the World Bank has maintained a
position that limits its ability to consider a nation's human rights record in
making its credit decisions.27 The Bank's position has been premised
20. See Daniel Bradlow & Claudio Grossman, Limited Mandates and Intertwined
Problems: A New Challenge for the World Bank and the IMF, 17 HuM. RTS. Q. 411, 431
(1995). Bradlow and Grossman have recommended that the Bank reinterpret the IBRD
and IDA Articles of Agreement, arguing that "while the [political activity] prohibition
has a continuing validity in excluding undue influences, it should not prevent the IFIs
and the multilateral development banks from incorporating all matters governed by
international law, such as human rights and the environment, into their operations."
Id., see also Moris, supra note 2, at 192-95; Stremlau & Sagasti, supra note 11, ch. 3,
20; Handl, supra note 13, at 647-48.
21. See Moris, supra note 2, at 182-92. Moris provides a good synopsis of the argu-
ments levied against IBRD consideration of human rights in credit decisions. The argu-
ments principally focus upon the intrusion into national sovereignty and alleged
ineffectiveness of World Bank human rights practices. See id. For an insightful critique
of Bank practice in the human rights sphere, see also Cahn, supra note 3.
22. See Ciorciari, supra note 4, at 342-45; Orford, supra note 4, at 464-70.
23. See Moris, supra note 2, at 183.
24. See id. at 184-88. Cahn and Orford also offer arguments supporting this conclu-
sion and challenging the notion that international institutions should actively advance
Western democracy and human rights in emerging markets. See generally Cahn, supra
note 3; Orford, supra note 4.
25. See Moris, supra note 2, at 182-83.
26. See Daniel D. Bradlow, Symposium: Social Justice and Development: Critical Issues
Facing the Bretton Woods System, 6 TRANSNAT'L & CONTEMPORARY PROBs. 47, 51 (1996).
27. See generally Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Prohibition of Political Activities in the Bank's
Work: Legal Opinion by the Senior Vice President & General Counsel, July 12, 1995 [here-
inafter Shihata, 1995 Memorandum]. This memorandum, addressed to the Bank's Execu-
tive Directors, sets forth the most authoritative and complete statement of the Bank's
recent policy regarding human rights considerations. The 1995 Memorandum elabo-
rated upon and refined some of the arguments and positions set forth in Shihata's 1990
memorandum on issues of "governance," which likewise includes an important state-
ment of the Bank's contemporary position on human rights. See generally Ibrahim F.I.
Shihata, Issues of "Governance" in Borrowing Members: The Extent of Their Relevance
Under the Bank's Articles of Agreement, Legal Memorandum of the General Counsel, Dec.
Cornell International Law Journal
upon its interpretation of the IBRD and IDA Articles of Agreement, which
explicitly prohibit "political" activity28 by the Bank and limit the Bank to
"economic considerations."29 The most important such provision, entitled
"Political Activity Prohibited," is set forth in Article IV, Section 10 of the
IBRD Articles of Agreement:
The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any
member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political char-
acter of the member or members concerned. Only economic considerations
shall be relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be
weighed impartially in order to achieve the purposes stated in Article 1.30
A narrower prohibition, restricting the use of IBRD loan proceeds,
appears in Section 5(b) of Article III. It is essentially a corollary to the
broader political activity provision restated above:
The Bank shall make arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any loan
are used only for the purposes for which the loan was granted, with due
attention to considerations of economy and efficiency and without regard to
political or other non-economic influences or considerations.
3 1
21, 1990 [hereinafter Shihata, Issues of "Governance"]; see also Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The
World Bank and "Governance" Issues in its Borrowing Members, in THE WORLD BANK IN A
CHANGING WORLD: SELECTED EssAYS 53-96 (summarizing much of Issues of "Govern-
ance"). The World Bank's policy is discussed in greater detail infra Part II.B.2.
28. The IBRD Articles of Agreement actually proscribe several types of "political"
activity. The provisions discussed below prohibit the Bank from indulging "political
influences or considerations," interfering in the "political affairs" of a member nation, or
being influenced by such nation's "political character." For an analysis of how these
concepts differ, see infra Part I1.A-B.
29. A discussion of what constitutes an "economic consideration" under the IBRD
Articles of Agreement is provided infra Part II.A.2.
30. IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 16, art. IV, § 10.
The IDA Articles of Agreement contain substantially identical provisions, creating the
same tension between the concepts of "economic" and "political." They likewise contain
a provision entitled "Political Activity Prohibited," nearly identical to its IBRD
counterpart:
The Association and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any
member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political charac-
ter of the member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall
be relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impar-
tially in order to achieve the purposes stated in this Agreement.
IDA Articles of Agreement, supra note 17, art. V, § 6.
31. IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 16, art. III, § 5(b). As another example
of the similarity between the IBRD and IDA Articles of Agreement, Article V, Section 1(g)
of the IDA Articles of Agreement, entitled "Use of Resources and Conditions of Financ-
ing," contains a provision similar to Article III, Section 5(b) of the 1BRD Charter:
The Association shall make arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any
financing are used only for the purposes for which the financing was provided,
with due attention to considerations of economy, efficiency and competitive
international trade and without regard to political or other non-economic influ-
ences or considerations.
Id. art. V, § 1(g).
The Bank has long focused upon the political activity provisions of the IBRD Charter
as the determinative objects for interpretation, and the parallel sections of the IDA Char-
ter have been interpreted in accordance with them. See SHIHATA, supra note 14, at 42-43.
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Although the Bank's policy on human rights intervention has not been
static over time, it has always hinged upon an interpretation of the terms
"economic" and "political" in the foregoing IBRD Charter provisions. 32
Essentially, the Bank has sought to balance the competing but related con-
cepts of politics and economics by considering human rights violations
only when such violations amount to obvious or preponderantly "eco-
nomic" concerns. 33 Under the Bank's interpretation, consideration of a
prospective borrower's human rights record is prohibited only when such
abuses do not have a "direct and obvious economic effect," or are prepon-
derantly "political" in nature.
34
To a large extent, the Bank's interpretation of the IBRD Articles of
Agreement has been developed and articulated by its General Counsel,35 to
whom the Bank has historically deferred for matters of charter interpreta-
tion.36 The Bank's previous General Counsel, Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, liberal-
ized the interpretation of the IBRD Charter somewhat, thereby allowing the
Bank to entertain a wider range of human rights considerations. 37 Never-
theless, Shihata supported the Bank's traditional distinction between
human rights concerns of a preponderantly "economic" and "political"
The IDA Charter mentions that its activities are intended to supplement those of the
IBRD. Id.
In addition, regional development banks such as the African Development Bank, Asian
Development Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank, whose charters contain sim-
ilar provisions, have long followed the lead of the IBRD in this and other policy deci-
sions. See Brian B.A. McAllister, The United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development: An Opportunity to Forge a New Unity in the World of the World Bank Among
Human Rights, the Environment, and Sustainable Development, 16 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 689, 702 (1993). As a result, this article will proceed with an examination
of the language of the IBRD Charter, cognizant of the parallel implications upon the
charters of the IDA and regional development banks. See infra note 45.
32. See, e.g., Shihata, 1995 Memorandum, supra note 27, at 28. From the earliest
documents issued by the Bank to its most recent policy memoranda, the "political activ-
ity" prohibition has always been the linchpin of its view toward human rights considera-
tions. See id. For a more detailed discussion of the historical emergence of the Bank's
policy with respect to human rights considerations, see infra Part II.B.2.
33. See Shihata, 1995 Memorandum, supra note 27, at 29-30; Shihata, Issues of "Gov-
ernance," supra note 27, at 55. These memoranda demonstrate that although the Bank's
policy has evolved somewhat over time, the essential principle remains that human
rights issues should be weighed for their "economic" significance.
34. See Shihata, 1995 Memorandum, supra note 27, at 29-30; see also Shihata, Issues
of "Governance," supra note 27, at 36. A more detailed discussion of the World Bank's
contemporary policy position is provided infra Part II.B.1.a.
35. See IBRAmiiM F.l. SHiHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD 2 (1991);
World Bank, Ko-Yung Tung is Appointed Vice President and General Counsel of the World
Bank, World Bank Press Release No. 2000/086/S, Nov. 5, 1999 [hereinafter World Bank
Press Release]. The General Counsel of the World Bank is responsible for advising the
Executive Directors and the Board of Governors of the World Bank on a variety of legal
issues, among the most important of which is the interpretation of its constitutive agree-
ments. See id.
36. See SHIHATA, supra note 35, at 2.
37. See generally Shihata, 1995 Memorandum, supra note 27. Shihata's 1995 memo-
randum clarified and expanded upon the pre-existing Bank policy.
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nature.38 Consequently, the IBRD continues to treat considerations of cer-
tain human rights abuses as prohibited by its Articles of Agreement, and
some means of promoting international human rights law remain outside
the Bank's legal purview.3
9
It is possible that the World Bank's position regarding human rights
considerations will be re-examined in the near future. Shihata stepped
down as General Counsel on October 15, 1998, and the Bank's Board of
Directors appointed Ko-Yung Tung as his successor on November 5,
1999.40 Tung assumes the incumbent authority of interpreting the Articles
of Agreement and therefore will be able to exert considerable influence on
the Bank's policy regarding human rights considerations, should he elect
to do So. 4 1
B. Purpose of this Article
Ultimately, the World Bank's position regarding its ability to entertain
human rights considerations is decisive because both the IBRD and IDA
Charters give the Bank the exclusive authority to interpret its Articles of
Agreement. 42 That explicit grant of interpretive power would make it quite
difficult for any member nation to mount a successful legal challenge to the
38. See id.; see also Shihata, Issues of "Governance," supra note 27 (discussing human
rights considerations in the context of the Bank's growing emphasis upon "good
governance").
39. See id.
40. See World Bank Press Release, supra note 35. This press release provides a brief
biographical sketch of Ko-Yung Tung and a synopsis of the responsibilities he inherited
as General Counsel.
41. See, e.g., Shihata, Issues of "Governance," supra note 27, at 21. In the past, the
World Bank has generally deferred to its Legal Department for interpretation of the
Charter. Thus, when the Bank's Executive Directors decide on a future interpretation of
the Charter, it is expected that they will "take into account the legal analysis provided by
the General Counsel and other relevant considerations." Id. Tung's opportunity to
reevaluate the World Bank's interpretation of the IBRD and IDA Articles of Agreement is
among the principal motives for this article.
42. See IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 16, art. IX, § (a)-(b). Article IX sets
forth the guidelines for interpreting the Charter's provisions. There is no provision deal-
ing with interpretation absent a dispute, and historically, the Bank has chosen to rely
upon the opinion of its General Counsel. See id.
In the event of a dispute among members or between the Bank and any member,
Article IX authorizes the Executive Directors of the Bank to interpret its terms, A mem-
ber dissatisfied with the Directors' interpretation may appeal to the Board of Governors,
whose interpretation is final. See id. The Executive Directors and the Board of Gover-
nors of the Bank thus hold the ultimate power to interpret the IBRD Articles. The rele-
vant provisions of Article IX are as follows:
(a) Any question of interpretation of the provisions of this Agreement arising
between any member and the Bank or between any members of the Bank shall
be submitted to the Executive Directors for their decision. If the question partic-
ularly affects any member not entitled to appoint an Executive Director, it shall
be entitled to representation in accordance with Article V, Section 4 (h).
(b) In any case where the Executive Directors have given a decision under (a)
above, any member may require that the question be referred to the Board of
Governors, whose decision shall be final. Pending the result of the reference to
the Board, the Bank may, so far as it deems necessary, act on the basis of the
decision of the Executive Directors.
Vol. 33
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Bank's interpretation. 43 Nevertheless, the Bank's position must be based
on a lawful interpretation of the Articles, meaning an interpretation consis-
tent with the principles and methodology of applicable international law.44
This article identifies and elucidates the proper interpretive methodology;
rigorously applies that methodology to the relevant provisions of the Arti-
cles;45 arrives at a legal interpretation of each such provision; and finally,
offers a conclusion regarding the scope of human rights considerations
that the Bank can lawfully entertain in making its credit decisions.
The analysis begins in Section I with a determination of the precise
methodology the Bank must follow in interpreting its constitutive agree-
ments. Section II applies the interpretive methodology to each of the criti-
cal terms and provisions of the IBRD Articles of Agreement. Based on that
analysis, Section III presents a composite interpretation of the relevant pro-
visions of the IBRD Charter and offers a conclusion regarding the Bank's
legal capacity to entertain human rights considerations in making its credit
decisions.
Id. The IDA Charter contains an analogous provision. See IDA Articles of Agreement,
supra note 17, art. X, § (a)-(b).
43. See Yozo Yokota, The Non-Political Character of the World Bank, 20 JAPANESE ANN.
OF INT'L L. 39, 41 (1976).
44. See Shihata, Issues of "Governance," supra note 27, at 21. Shihata acknowledged
that "[t]he legal interpretation of treaty provisions such as the Bank's Articles is subject
to general rules of international law developed through centuries of state practice, judi-
cial precedents and scholarly works. Such 'customary' rules have been codified in two
articles of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties." Id.
The customary rules of international law governing interpretation of the IBRD and
IDA Charters are the subject of extensive discussion infra Part I. Articles 31 and 32 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties set forth the basic elements of the applica-
ble interpretive methodology and are widely considered to have codified preexisting cus-
tomary international law. See Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, art. 1, 31-32 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna
Convention].
45. The analysis contained herein will focus upon the relevant provisions of the
IBRD Articles of Agreement, namely Article IV, Section 10 and Article III, Section 5(b).
See IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 16, art. IV, § 10, art. III, § 5(b). For the
relevant text of these provisions, see supra notes 30-31. The IDA Articles of Agreement
contain a provision substantially identical to Article IV, Section 10 of the IBRD Charter,
which has been and should be interpreted in a consistent manner. See IDA Articles of
Agreement, supra note 17, art. V, § 6. Therefore, this article will proceed with an analy-
sis of Article IV, Section 10 of the IBRD Charter, aware of the parallel implications with
respect to Article V, Section 6 of the IDA Articles.
There is no direct counterpart to Article Ill, Section 5(b) of the IBRD Charter in the
IDA Articles of Agreement. See generally IDA Articles of Agreement, supra note 17.
Therefore, the discussion relating to its provisions technically applies only to the IBRD.
Nevertheless, in practice, the IBRD and IDA perform largely integrated functions, and
throughout its history, the World Bank has looked to the IBRD Articles as the determina-
tive instrument for interpretation. See Wadrzyk, supra note 1, at 558; Shihata, 1995
Memorandum, supra note 27, at 5-9; Shihata, Issues of "Governance," supra note 27
(exemplifying the Bank's decision to analyze the IBRD Articles as the determinative
instrument and interpret the IDA Articles accordingly).
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I. The Interpretive Methodology
As binding agreements among nations, the IBRD and IDA Articles of
Agreement constitute treaties under international law.4 6 As the IBRD and
IDA Charters predate the Vienna Convention, which represents the author-
itative modern convention on the law of treaties,4 7 the body of law control-
ling their interpretation is the customary international law that existed at
the time they were concluded and entered into force.48 However, the provi-
sions of the Vienna Convention dealing with treaty interpretation were
widely accepted as declaratory of preexisting customary law. Thus, those
provisions essentially restate the basic legal principles applicable to an
interpretation of the IBRD and IDA Charters. 4 9 Articles 31 and 3250 of the
Vienna Convention articulate the required methodology for interpretation
of a treaty and its constituent terms and provisions.51
46. See Louis A. HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATIALS 416 (3d ed.
1993). A treaty is generically defined as any binding agreement, governed by interna-
tional law, between or among subjects of international law. See id.
47. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties applies only to treaties concluded
between states; for which it is the "principal authoritative source of the law." HENKIN Er
AL., supra note 46, at 416; see Vienna Convention, supra note 44, art. 1.
48. See Vienna Convention, supra note 44, art. 4. Article 4 of the Vienna Convention
declares that the Convention is not retroactive; however, it also states that it is "without
prejudice to the application of any rules set forth in the present Convention to which
treaties would be subject under international law independently of the Convention." Id.
Thus, customary international law governs the interpretation of treaties concluded prior
to the Convention.
Among the most valuable discussions of the preexisting customary law of treaty inter-
pretation was written by the long-time President of the International Court of Justice,
Eduardo Jimdnez de Ardchaga. De Archaga explains the relationship between the
Vienna Convention methodology and the preexisting international customary law. His
discussion is particularly useful because it elucidates the nuances of treaty interpreta-
tion left unclear by a plain reading of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention. See
Eduardo Jim~nez de Archaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159
RECUEIL DES Couas 35-49 (1978). For another discussion of the customary international
law of treaty interpretation, see generally James F. Hogg, The International Court: Rules
of Treaty Interpretation, 43 MINN. L. REv. 369 (1959).
49. See MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 121 (5th
ed. 1984); HENKIN ET AL., supra note 46, at 416-17. The Vienna Convention was the
result of a project begun by the International Law Commission in 1949 and largely
represents a codification of preexisting norms of customary international law. Id. In
particular, Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention, which set forth the relevant law
regarding treaty interpretation, were adopted at the Vienna Convention without a dis-
senting vote and are considered to have been declaratory of preexisting customary law.
See de Ar~chaga, supra note 48, at 39, 42.
50. Note that Article 33 also pertains to treaty interpretation. However, its applica-
tion is limited to treaties authenticated in two or more languages. Since the IBRD and
IDA Articles of Agreement were authenticated only in English, the terms of Article 33 do
not apply.
51. See Vienna Convention, supra note 44, art. 31; de Ar~chaga, supra note 48, at 42-
49. Article 31 sets forth the general rule:
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of
its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
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The methodology codified in the Vienna Convention sets forth a rela-
tively clear process and establishes a hierarchy of sources to be used in
treaty interpretation. Most importantly, it conveys the primacy of textual
analysis over analysis of travaux pr6paratoires.52 Article 31 requires the
interpretation of a treaty to begin with an analysis of the ordinary meaning
of its terms' 3 in the context of the treaty's remaining provisions, particu-
larly its stated purposes, and any instruments related to the treaty.' 4 Arti-
(a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties
in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with
the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument
related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation
of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between
the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties
so intended.
Vienna Convention, supra note 44, art. 31. If an interpretation under the methodology
of Article 31 proves inadequate, Article 32 permits recourse to supplementary means of
interpretation:
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the prepar-
atory work of the treaty and circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the
meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when
the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
Id. art. 32.
52. See de Archaga, supra note 48, at 43 (citing the proceedings of the International
Law Commission). Before and during the Vienna Conference, there was a polarization
of two schools of thought regarding treaty interpretation. According to one school, the
fundamental objective was "to establish what the text means according to the ordinary or
apparent signification of its terms." Id. The other school contended that "the prime,
indeed, the only legitimate object, is to ascertain and give effect to the intentions or
presumed intentions of the parties." Id.
As a practical matter, the major difference between the two schools lies in their treat-
ment of the travaux prparatoires, or preparatory work of the treaty. Those who would
emphasize the intent of the parties treat the travaux prCparatoires and the text of the
treaty as equally important, since each reveals the parties' intentions. Conversely, those
who would emphasize the meaning of the text place travaux preparatoires in a
subordinate role, used only as a secondary or supplemental resource for interpretation.
See id.
The International Law Commission submitted the determinative proposal for interpre-
tive rules to the Vienna Conference. In comments to its proposal, the Commission
wrote: "[The proposal] is based on the view that the text must be presumed to be the
authentic expression of the intentions of the parties; and that, in consequence, the start-
ing point of interpretation is the elucidation of the meaning of the text, not an investiga-
tion ab initio of the intentions of the parties." Id. (citing the proceedings of the
International Law Commission).
53. See Vienna Convention, supra note 44, art. 31(1)-(2). Intrinsic materials include
the text of the treaty and any related instruments executed by the parties in connection
with or subsequent to the conclusion of the treaty. See id.
54. See id. De Ar~chaga notes that the object and purpose of the treaty are deliber-
ately mentioned to assert that they are part of the textual context within which terms
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cle 31 then proceeds to identify further sources of interpretation that
indicate express or implied consent among the parties, including subse-
quent agreements, subsequent practice, and relevant rules of international
law.55 This methodology of interpretation has been described as encercle-
ment progressif, by which one departs incrementally from the text to iden-
tify appropriate sources for interpretation.
56
The final provision of Article 31 represents a concession to the theory
that the intention of the parties should govern treaty interpretation.5 7 It
permits a special meaning to be ascribed to a term "if it is established that
the parties so intended."58 The possibility of a special meaning opens the
door to consideration of the travaux preparatoires.59 However, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice has held that the standard of proof for such a special
meaning is high; any party seeking to establish a special meaning must
"demonstrate convincingly the use of the term with that special
meaning. "60
Article 32 designates travaux prdparatoires as the supplemental means
of interpretation to be employed when an interpretation under the process
of Article 31 "leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure" or "leads to a
result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable." 61 However, Articles 31
and 32 neither establish "two distinct and successive phases in the process
of interpretation" nor require that travaux preparatoires only be examined
after first exhausting all intrinsic sources. 62 Rather, the process of inter-
pretation may proceed with travaux prdparatoires playing an ongoing and
important, though secondary, role in the interpretation of the text.
63
must be interpreted. Although they are deemed important in that regard, they are not an
autonomous source of interpretation. See de Ar~chaga, supra note 48, at 44.
55. See Vienna Convention, supra note 44, art. 31(3).
56. See de Ardchaga, supra note 48, at 44 (attributing the phrase to Max Hiaber). The
description was coined by Max Hfiber and connotes the progressive "circles" of interpre-
tation mandated by customary international law and set forth in the Vienna Convention.
Htiber's analogy is an important one because it clarifies the process articulated in Arti-
cles 31 and 32.
57. See de Archaga, supra note 48, at 44-48. The United States government was a
principal advocate of placing a treaty's preparatory work on the same level of impor-
tance as the "intrinsic" sources of interpretation. Professor McDougal of the American
delegation to the Vienna Conference argued that the goal of interpretation was to ascer-
tain "the common intent of the parties." Subordinating preparatory work in the interpre-
tive hierarchy would frustrate that goal. Ultimately, the proposal of the International
Law Commission adopted at the Conference reflected something of a compromise
between the two competing schools of thought and followed the established practice of
the International Court of Justice. See id. at 46-47; see also supra note 52.
58. Vienna Convention, supra note 44, art. 31(4).
59. See de Ar~chaga, supra note 48, at 46.
60. Id. at 44 (citing Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975, p. 53, refer-
ring to the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland case, PICJ, Series A/B, No. 53, p. 49).
61. Vienna Convention, supra note 44, art. 32(a)-(b).
62. See de Ardchaga, supra note 48, at 47.
63. See id. Sir Humphrey Wadlock commented on the Vienna Convention interpre-
tive process, stating that "all the various elements, as they were present in any given case,
would be thrown into the crucible and their interaction would give the legally relevant
interpretation." Id.
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II. Applying the Interpretive Methodology
The preceding discussion elucidated the process by which the IBRD
and IDA Articles of Agreement must be interpreted. This section under-
takes to apply that methodology to arrive at an accurate legal interpreta-
tion of the IBRD Charter.64 Section II(A) contains the first element in that
process: an analysis of the ordinary meaning of the relevant terms and pro-
visions in their textual context. Section II(B) then examines secondary
sources of interpretation: the subsequent practice of the World Bank mem-
bers in their application of the treaty and relevant rules of international
law. Finally, Section II(C) proceeds to the issue of travaux preparatoires,
which, absent a clearly intended "special meaning," are properly treated as
an important tertiary source for interpretation. Before embarking upon the
task of interpretation, it is necessary to identify the terms and provisions of
the IBRD Charter relevant to the issue of whether the Bank lawfully may
consider a prospective borrower's human rights record.
Two sections of the IBRD Charter are of utmost importance. The
broader clause is Article IV, Section 10, which proscribes two distinct types
of "political" activity. First, it prohibits the Bank and its officers from inter-
fering in the "political affairs" of any member nation.65 Second, it prohib-
its the Bank and its officers from considering a nation's "political
character. '66 Article IV, Section 10 thus directs the Bank and its officers to
entertain only "economic considerations.
'67
Article III, Section 5(b) of the IBRD Charter sets forth a narrower pro-
hibition, dealing only with the use of loan proceeds. It requires that the
Bank "make arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any loan are used
only for the purposes for which the loan was granted, with due attention to
considerations of economy and efficiency and without regard to political
or other non-economic influences or considerations. '68 Analogous to Arti-
cle IV, Section 10, this narrower provision limits the Bank to economic
considerations. 69 However, it also explicitly bars political influences or
considerations from affecting the Bank's decisionmaking process, a con-
cept absent in Article IV, Section 10.70
64. Although not addressed in this discussion, an analysis of the IDA Articles of
Agreement would proceed in similar fashion. See supra notes 30, 45.
65. See IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 16, art. IV, § 10; see also supra note
30 and accompanying text.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 16, art. III, § 5(b). This provision does
not have a direct counterpart in the IDA Articles of Agreement, and technically its provi-
sions therefore apply only to the IBRD. However, in a practical sense, they are also
relevant to the practices of the IDA, which are largely integrated with those of the IBRD.
See supra notes 31, 45.
69. See IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 16, art. III, § 5(b); see also supra notes
30-31 and accompanying text.
70. See id.
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The foregoing discussion highlights four principal clauses governing
the matter of human rights considerations. Each contains a critical term
or phrase requiring interpretation:
1. the Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any
member;
2. the Bank and its officers shall not be influenced in their decisions by the
political character of the member or members concerned;
3. only economic considerations shall be relevant to the decisions of the Bank
and its officers; and
4. the Bank shall make arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any loan
are used only for the purposes for which the loan was granted, with due
attention to considerations of economy and efficiency and without regard to
political or other non-economic influences or considerations.71
None of the critical terms is defined in the Articles of Agreement, 72 and
each must be examined in its respective context to determine its ordinary
meaning for purposes of the present interpretation.
A. Ordinary Meaning Analysis
The first guideline set out in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, and
the first step in the encerclement progressif, requires that a treaty "be inter-
preted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose."73 The ordinary meaning of the provisions is the primary inter-
pretive source under the methodology developed in customary interna-
tional law and restated in the Vienna Convention.74 Therefore, a rigorous
interpretation of the IBRD Articles of Agreement must begin with a plain
reading of the critical terms and provisions in the context of the Charter's
other provisions and its stated purposes. 7
5
1. Distinction Between the Terms "Political" and "Economic"
A logical starting point for an ordinary meaning analysis is to differen-
tiate the words "economic" and "political." However, the difficulty of dis-
tinguishing the plain meaning of "political" and "economic" influences,
considerations and activities is immediately apparent.7 6 Shihata has
endeavored to distinguish the two by analysis of the dictionary definitions
71. These four critical clauses represent the author's conceptual breakdown of the
relevant IBRD Charter provisions. For the actual text of the provisions, see supra notes
30-31 and accompanying text.
72. See Bradlow, supra note 26, at 54.
73. Vienna Convention, supra note 44, art. 31(1).
74. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text; see also Susan Jeanne Topfer &
Bryan Stuart Wells, The Worldwide Market for Sex: A Review of International and Regional
Legal Prohibitions Regarding Trafficking in Women, 2 MICH.J. GENDER & LAw 83, 99 n.106
(noting that a term's plain meaning is controlling under the Vienna Convention
methodology).
75. See id. As no other agreements were formalized in connection with the conclu-
sion of the IBRD and IDA Articles of Agreement, no reference needs to be made to exter-
nal documents in the course of the ordinary meaning analysis.
76. See Shihata, Issues of "Governance," supra note 27, at 23.
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and etymologies of the words.77 He concludes that in order to draw a dis-
tinction "political" factors must involve either: belonging to or favoring a
particular political party or partisan faction or following the political prin-
ciples, convictions, or opinions of a particular party or individual.78 "Eco-
nomic" factors, by contrast, must include the management of a nation's
money, finances, and resources.
79
Although Shihata's plain meaning analysis is helpful, it does not
answer the critical question of whether the Bank may consider human
rights issues that are both "political" and "economic" in some sense.
80
While human rights abuses are often linked to partisan political struggles,
they tend to impact adversely a nation's economic and human resources as
well.81 To resolve this matter, it is necessary to look more closely at the
language of the IBRD Charter.
Under both Article IV, Section 10 and Article III, Section 5(b), the
Bank must base its decisions only upon economic considerations.8 2 Con-
sequently, the interpretive problem only arises when the human rights vio-
lations in question have some degree of economic importance. In such a
case, the ordinary meaning of Article IV, Section 10 is less informative
since human rights could simultaneously constitute an "economic consid-
eration" as well as an aspect of a nation's "political affairs" or "political
character."
Regrettably, the IBRD Articles of Agreement provide little contextual
evidence regarding the meaning of the terms "political affairs" or "political
character."8 3 Therefore, it is difficult to discern, on the basis of a plain
reading of the text, precisely when economically relevant human rights
considerations are proscribed by Article IV, Section 10. To resolve that
77. For Shihata's full discussion of the ordinary meanings of "political" and "eco-
nomic," see id. at 22-23.
78. See id. at 24.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 24-30. Shihata does not assert that his plain meaning analysis provides
the definitive answer as to when the Bank can entertain human rights considerations.
Rather, he acknowledges the need to balance the competing concepts between "eco-
nomic" and "political" subject-matter under the IBRD Charter. Id.
81. For a discussion of the economic impact of human rights abuses, see infra Part
II.A.3. Shihata acknowledges "economic considerations in their broad sense do extend
to the manner in which the state manages its resources, and may thus become difficult
to isolate from political considerations, especially in 'policy-based' lending." Shihata,
Issues of "Governance," supra note 27, at 25.
82. See IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 16, art. IV, § 10, art. III, § 5(b) (per-
mitting "[o]nly economic considerations"). There is relative consensus in the literature
that the plain meaning of the IBRD Charter precludes "non-economic factors" from con-
sideration. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 18, at 56 ("On the face of the Articles,
'noneconomical' factors are prohibited from being taken into account in, for example,
determining a lending program in a particular country. Read literally, the IBRD cannot,
in conformance with its own Articles of Agreement, assess a country's 'performance' in
terms of its human rights record."); Marmorstein, supra note 2, at 120-21; see also Barry
E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime,
75 CALIF. L. REv. 1162, 1218 n.231 (1987).
83. The terms are not defined in the IBRD Charter, and their context provides little
succor. See Bradlow, supra note 26, at 54.
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question, this analysis will be forced to rely upon other sources of
interpretation.
8 4
The language of the IBRD Charter provides evidence that Article III,
Section 5(b) does not prevent the Bank from lawfully considering human
rights violations so long as those violations amount to "economic consider-
ations." Rather, Section 5(b) merely instructs the Bank to direct loan pro-
ceeds with "due attention to considerations of economy and efficiency and
without regard to political or other non-economic influences or considera-
tions."85 The proscription of "political or other non-economic influences or
considerations"8 6 is of great import because it implicitly defines "political"
influences as one subset of "non-economic" considerations. According to
this deduction, "political" considerations are prohibited precisely because
they are not "economic" factors, and the IBRD is permitted to contemplate
only economic factors in making its decisions. Thus, the Bank may con-
sider human rights violations in the course of its lending decisions if, but
only if, they amount to an "economic consideration."8 7
2. Human Rights Violations as "Economic Considerations"
Although the IBRD Charter does not explicitly define "economic con-
siderations,"88 it does provide some contextual evidence of the term's
meaning. Article III articulates the terms and conditions upon which the
Bank may make loans. Section 4(v) instructs the Bank, when making or
guaranteeing a loan, to "pay due regard to the prospects that the borrower,
and, if the borrower is not a member, that the guarantor, will be in position
to meet its obligations under the loan .... 89
Article III, Section 4(v) does not necessarily represent an exhaustive
definition of "economic considerations" under the IBRD Charter.90
Instead, the provision merely establishes that a member's prospective abil-
84. See infra Part II.B-C. When the ordinary meaning analysis is unable to resolve an
interpretive issue with adequate clarity, the interpretation must be made by reference to
the secondary and tertiary shells in Hfber's encercdement progressif. See supra notes 55-
61 and accompanying text. The following sections will attempt to resolve precisely
when the World Bank can consider economically relevant human rights abuses by deter-
mining when (if ever) such considerations are proscribed as "political" activities.
85. IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 16, art. III, § 5(b).
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87. Of course, this power is subject to the limitations of Article IV, Section 10. See
id. art. IV, § 10.
88. See Bradlow, supra note 26, at 54.
89. IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 16, art. III, § 4(v).
90. See id. Article III, Section 4(v) does not limit the definition of "economic consid-
erations" to factors which affect a borrower's ability to repay a loan. However, it is the
only provision in the IBRD Charter that identifies a definitive set of such considerations.
The only other relevant provision in the IBRD Articles of Agreement is Article III, Section
5(b), which implicitly equates economic considerations with "considerations of econ-
omy and efficiency." See id. art. III, § 5(b). Unfortunately, that equation is not very
helpful to the present interpretive effort.
Thus, although a plain reading of the IBRD Charter cannot establish the complete
universe of "economic considerations" with any certainty, it does establish that a coun-
try's human rights violations amount to an "economic consideration" whenever they
affect that nation's ability to meet its loan obligations to the Bank.
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ity to repay its IBRD and IDA loans is a valid economic issue for the Bank
to consider. It follows that any factor that impacts a borrower's ability to
meet its obligations must be a permissible subject for the Bank's
consideration. 9 1
Of course, the Bank still must determine, on a case-by-case basis,
whether a particular nation's human rights record presents an "economic
consideration." The important point is that the World Bank may deem a
nation's human rights record an "economic consideration" whenever a rea-
sonable creditor in the Bank's position would consider the record pertinent
in assessing the likelihood that the borrower will meet its prospective debt
obligations.
There is substantial evidence that a nation's human rights violations
frequently rise to the level of "economic considerations," as contemplated
by Article III, Section 4(v), by affecting a nation's economic growth, the
financial success of its development programs, and its resultant ability to
service its debt. Such evidence comes from several sources, including:
studies by international economists, which demonstrate that human rights
and the rule of law are empirically linked to healthy and sustainable eco-
nomic growth;92 the policies and practices of bilateral and private lenders
in their dealings with emerging markets; 93 and the World Bank's own field
experience, which has shown that a nation's human rights violations can
91. See Handl, supra note 13, at 648-50. Handl asserts that "it is accepted wisdom
that noneconomic factors entailing economic consequences that affect international
financial project or program activities should be taken into account by MDBs simply as a
matter of sound banking practice." Id. at 649.
92. See generally Arup Banjeri & Hafez Ghanem, Does the Type of Political Regime
Matter for Trade and Labor Market Practices?, 11 WORLD BANK Ec. REv. 171, (1997)
(analyzing the impact of human rights and the rule of law upon economic growth and
concluding that the protection of basic civil and political liberties is directly related to
the development and performance of a productive market economy); Jonathan Isham et.
al., Civil Liberties, Democracy and the Performance of Government Projects, 11 WORLD
BANK Ec. REv. 219 (1997) (describing a similar study focusing on government projects
and arriving at similar conclusions); Katarina Tomasevski, International Law and World
Hunger, 70 IowA L. Rev. 1321, 1326 (1985) (asserting, on the basis of "substantial
research," that violations of free speech and association are inextricably linked to eco-
nomic growth).
Addressing the American Society of International Law, John Kneller, an executive
from Citicorp explained the economic importance of human rights protections:
"Employees whose basic nutritional and medical needs are met will be better and more
productive workers .... Employees who do not have to live in fear of a battered-in door
in the middle of the night, or of speaking freely to one another at appropriate times
during the work day, will be more focused on the profitable task at hand." John M.
Kneller, Human Rights, Multinational Business and International Financial Institutions, 88
Am. Soc'Y Irr'nL L. PRoc. 271, 274 (1994).
93. See Marmorstein, supra note 2, at 127-30. Marmorstein discusses the country
risk and exposure analyses conducted by commercial banks in the course of their lend-
ing to developing nations and others accused of significant human rights abuses. Such
credit risk analyses include an examination of government practices, such as human
rights abuses, apt to destabilize the economy. This practice of considering a nation's
legal and political hazards is not new to the private banking industry. See id. at 127.
The practice of bilateral donors is also relevant. Many governments take a recipient
nation's human rights record into account when determining aid appropriations. To the
extent that human rights abuses lead to a decrease in a country's bilateral aid and capi-
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profoundly impact the financial success of specific projects.94
3. Purposes of the Bank's Articles of Agreement
International law requires that the terms of a treaty be interpreted not
only in their grammatical context, but also "in the light of [the treaty's]
object and purpose. ' '95 For present purposes, the most relevant of the
IBRD Charter's enumerated objectives is set forth in Article I, Section (i):
the reconstruction and development of its member nations. 96 The stated
purpose in Section (i) with the greatest nexus to human rights considera-
tions is "the encouragement of the development of productive facilities and
resources."97 However, the term "development" is not defined in the IBRD
Charter,9 8 and the ordinary meanings of the terms "encouragement" and
"resources" are open to a wide range of interpretation.
tal inflow, that country is apt to have more difficulty servicing its IBRD and IDA debt.
See id. at 129.
94. See McAllister, supra note 31, at 702-04 (describing the negative reaction of
human rights organizations to the Bank's failure adequately to take into account its bor-
rowers' local human rights abuses); Wendt, supra note 7, at 153-55 (same). See id.; see
also Stremlau & Sagasti, supra note 11, ch. 3, 11 1; cf. Michael Reisman, Through or
Despite Governments: Differentiated Responsibilities in Human Rights Programs, 72 IowA
L. REv. 391, 395 (1987) (discussing the role a corporation can play in human rights
development). One example of such a project was the Volta Dam project in Ghana. See
McAllister, supra note 31, at 691-92. Patricia Armstrong has also noted a number of
recent Bank projects plagued with serious human rights problems. See Patricia Arm-
strong, The World Bank and Human Rights: Policies and Prospects, 11 PACE INT'L L.REv.
239, 245-47 (1999).
These and other projects have contributed to a high rate of financial failure in the
Bank's work for the past decade, supporting the conclusion that violations of interna-
tionally recognized human rights are inherently matters of "economic" concern. See
McAllister, supra note 31, at 705 (citing a study concluding that 37.5% of World Bank
projects in 1991 achieved unsatisfactory economic results). But see Cahn, supra note 3,
at 160 (attributing the World Bank's "strong tendency toward systematic failure" to the
Bank's activist role as a "governance institution").
Shihata acknowledges that
[Human rights violations] can affect the country's stability, prospective
creditworthiness, and ability to carry out Bank-financed projects, and they can
impede the Bank's ability to supervise the investments it sponsors. Obviously,
these are factors that the Bank must take into account to the extent that they
prove relevant in the circumstances of a specific case and not as a factor to
politicize its activities.
Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Environment, Economic Development and Human Rights: A Triangu-
lar Relationship?, Remarks, Apr. 20-23, 1988, reprinted in 82 AM. Soc'Y INTL. L. PROC. 40,
45 (1988).
95. Vienna Convention, supra note 44, art. 31(1).
96. The Bank's first enumerated purpose is
To assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of members by
facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes, including the res-
toration of economies destroyed or disrupted by war, the reconversion of pro-
ductive facilities to peacetime needs and the encouragement of the development
of productive facilities and resources in less developed countries.
IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 16, art. I, § (i).
The remaining purposes set forth in Article I provide no additional guidance relevant to
the present interpretive inquiry. See id. art. I, §§ (ii)-(v).
97. Id. art. I, § (i).
98. See Bradlow, supra note 26, at 53.
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In recent years, the academic literature and international declarations
have defined the concept "development" with increasing breadth.99 Several
authors have argued that to fulfill its development mandate, the Bank must
be permitted to take human rights considerations into account, regardless
of the extent of their "political" nature. 100 Such arguments have relied on
the approach to "development" espoused in declarations and statements by
officials of the United Nations'01 and its constituent agencies.' 0 2 How-
ever, the usage of the term "development" in international declarations and
speeches does not definitively establish the meaning of the IBRD Charter's
stated purposes. Therefore, while it would be possible to analyze the
expansion of the concept of "development" in discussing the Charter's
stated purposes, that analysis is more appropriately reserved for the sec-
tion below addressing the "subsequent practice" of the Bank.' 03
The IBRD Charter does provide a notable exception to its normally
binding purposes, articulated in Article III, Section 4(vii). That provision
allows the Bank, under "special circumstances," to make or guarantee
loans in pursuit of objectives other than reconstruction or development.
10 4
However, Article III, Section 4(vii) has been employed sparingly in the
Bank's work,10 5 and the Charter's remaining provisions provide no indica-
99. See id. at 48; Wolfgang H. Reinicke, Can International Financial Institutions Pre-
vent Internal Violence? The Sources of Ethno-National Conflict in Transitional Societies, in
PREVENTING CONFLICT IN THE POST-COMMUNIST WORLD: MOBILIZING INTERNATIONAL AND
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 281, 285 (Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes eds.,
1996).
100. See Bradlow & Grossman, supra note 20, at 414. Bradlow and Grossman argue
that "IFIs cannot address the problem of poverty or the monetary problems of develop-
ing countries without considering the issues of refugees, environmental degradation, the
capacity of the state to effectively and equitably manage its resources, population policy,
and human rights, including the status of women, indigenous people, and minorities."
Id.; see also Bradlow, supra note 26, at 51; Handl, supra note 13, at 645, 649-51 (noting
the tension between the Bank's mandate and its goal of achieving "sustainable
development").
101. See Louise Frdchette, "The Price of Peace - the Crucial Role of Development in
Peacemaking and Peacekeeping," Speech delivered at the International Peace Academy in
New York (May 11, 1998), in M2 PREsswlRE, May 13, 1998 ("Issues of governance and
human rights nowadays form an integral part of any strategy for development.").
102. See, e.g., Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development, in Report of the U.N.
World Summit for Social Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.166/9 (1995) [hereinafter
Copenhagen Declaration]. The Copenhagen Declaration states that sustainable develop-
ment must incorporate, inter alia, democracy, social justice, and observance of human
rights. See id.
The Declaration on the Right to Development also supports the notion that develop-
ment encompasses a comprehensive process involving social, cultural, and political, as
well as economic, dimensions. See Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res.
41/128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 186, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1986).
103. See infra Part II.B.1.
104. See IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 16, art. III, § 4(vii) ("Loans made or
guaranteed by the Bank shall, except in special circumstances, be for the purpose of
specific projects of reconstruction or development.").
105. See Levinson, supra note 18, at 49-50. Levinson asserts that the "special circum-
stances" provision was the legal basis for the emergence of structural adjustment lending
by the World Bank. See id.
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don of what would constitute "special circumstances." 10 6 As a result, the
scope of this potentially expansive loophole in the Bank's mandate remains
too indefinite to contribute meaningfully to the present analysis.
10 7
4. Conclusions from the Textual Analysis
The foregoing ordinary meaning analysis provides limited insight
regarding when the World Bank can lawfully entertain human rights con-
siderations in the course of its credit decisions. To consider an applicant's
human rights record as a factor in its credit decisions, the Bank must first
determine when that nation's abuses amount to an "economic considera-
tion." That entails deciding whether a reasonable lender in the Bank's
position would deem the abuses relevant to the applicant nation's prospec-
tive ability to service its IBRD and IDA debt obligations. 10 8 If the "eco-
nomic" criterion is satisfied, the Bank next must determine whether its
consideration of the abuses in question will violate the "political activity"
prohibitions contained in its Articles of Agreement. Ordinary meaning
analysis of the Articles is of limited utility because it has proven unable to
answer the latter inquiry, which must be resolved by turning to other
sources of interpretation.
B. Secondary Intrinsic Sources
As determined above, international law demands an interpretive pro-
cess aptly described as encerclement progressif, whereby textual evidence
comprises the innermost evidentiary circle. 10 9 The second stage in that
process involves analyzing circumstances which indicate express or
implied agreement among the Bank's members regarding the meaning of
the IBRD and IDA Charter provisions: subsequent agreements, subsequent
practice and relevant rules of international law.110 The Bank's members
have not executed any formal agreement regarding the interpretation of its
Articles of Agreement. Consequently, for purposes of the present analysis,
106. See id. The literature does not provide significant further discussion of the
provision.
107. Article III, Section 4(vii) could be interpreted so broadly as to permit almost any
conceivable purpose. In practice, the Bank has not explicitly relied upon it to any nota-
ble extent. Shihata does not rely upon it in any of his opinions. See, e.g., Shihata, 1995
Memorandum, supra note 27; Shihata, Issues of "Governance," supra note 27.
108. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
109. For a fuller discussion of the interpretive process developed under customary
international law and set forth in the Vienna Convention, see supra Part I.
110. See Vienna Convention, supra note 44, art. 31(3). Specifically, the Vienna Con-
vention identifies three such factors for consideration:
(a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation
of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between
the parties.
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the Bank's subsequent practice and the relevant rules of international law
constitute the only applicable secondary sources for interpretation.
1. Subsequent World Bank Practice in the Human Rights Arena
The Vienna Convention requires analysis of the subsequent practice of
the World Bank in the human rights arena because such practice provides
evidence of agreement among the Bank's member nations to follow a par-
ticular interpretation of the IBRD and IDA Articles of Agreement. 11
Unfortunately, as will be discussed below, the Bank's practice does little to
clarify the parties' understanding of the relevant provisions of the IBRD
and IDA Charters. Rather, the Bank's practice in the area confirms that its
member nations have been unable to reach a consensus regarding the Arti-
cles' interpretation.
a. Development of a Human Rights Policy
Not surprisingly, the World Bank was not very involved in the area of
human rights during its formative years, when international human rights
law remained largely inchoate. However, as the principles of international
human rights law began to take on a more definite and binding quality,"x2
the World Bank was confronted with the dual issues of whether and when
consideration of a nation's human rights practices in the context of credit
decisions violate the Articles of Agreement.
It was not until the mid-1960s, in a landmark dispute between the
IBRD and the United Nations General Assembly, that the World Bank
began to clarify its position on human rights considerations." 3 In 1965
and 1966, the United Nations issued a series of resolutions appealing to
the Bank to cease lending money to South Africa and Portugal 1 4 because
111. The policy and practice of the World Bank are subsumed under the language of
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention requiring analysis of "subsequent practice" of the
parties. The policy positions taken by the Bank do not rise to the level of agreements
between its members, but they are properly treated as a component of IBRD and IDA.
practice.
112. See HENKIN Er aL., supra note 46, at 596-97.
113. For an excellent discussion of the dispute between the U.N. General Assembly
and the World Bank, see generally Samuel A. Bleicher, U.N. v. IBRD: A Dilemma of Func-
tionalism, 24 INT'L ORGAMnZATION 31 (1970).
114. On December 14, 1960, the General Assembly passed the Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514(XV). In
1961, the General Assembly passed a second resolution, G.A. Res. 1654(XVI), to imple-
ment the Declaration. Although Portugal was among the nations deemed to be in fla-
grant violation of the Declaration, the World Bank continued to loan money to Portugal,
and, in 1965, the General Assembly issued a request for the Bank to desist. That
request, part of G.A. Res. 2107(XX), was as follows: "[The General Assembly] appeals to
all specialized agencies, in particular to the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development and the International Monetary Fund, to refrain from granting Portugal
any financial, economic, or technical assistance so long as the Government of Portugal
fails to implement General Assembly resolution 1514(XV)." Id. A similar appeal was
made to the World Bank in paragraph 10 of G.A. Res. 2054(XX), with respect to South
Africa, whose apartheid regime was likewise considered a flagrant transgression of inter-
national human rights law.
Cornell International Law Journal
their governments were deemed to be in gross violation of international
human rights standards. 15 While the loans were pending, then IBRD
President George Woods circulated a statement to the Bank's directors cit-
ing Article IV, Section 10 and proposing that the Bank treat the loans to
Portugal and South Africa as it would treat any other loans, contemplating
human rights abuses only to the extent they represented economic con-
cerns. n 6 The World Bank thereafter refused to honor the General Assem-
bly requests," 7 concluding that its Articles of Agreement forbade
adherence to the U.N. resolutions"1 8
During the course of the dispute, the IBRD articulated its position in a
series of communications to the General Assembly. 19 President Woods'
statement encapsulated the twofold rationale for the IBRD's noncompli-
ance. First, the Bank held that adherence to the resolutions would
represent an intrusion into the "political affairs" of South Africa and Portu-
gal under Article IV, Section 10.120 Second, the Bank had not found that
the human rights abuses raised sufficient economic concerns to deny the
loan applications.'
2 '
The position articulated by the IBRD in the course of its dispute with
the U.N. General Assembly contained a pair of noteworthy principles.
First, President Woods acknowledged, by negative implication, that the
Bank could consider human rights factors when they had a meaningful
115. See Bleicher, supra note 113, at 31. In South Africa, the policy of apartheid was
deemed a gross violation of international human rights law, while Portugal was cited for
its colonial practices.
116. See Statement of IBRD President Woods to Executive Directors on Mar. 29, 1966,
in Statement of IBRD General Counsel to U.N. Fourth Committee, 21 U.N. GAOR, C.4
(1645th mtg.) 317-18 (1966), reprinted in 13 M. WimM~AN, DIG. OF INT'L L. 1005 (1970)
[hereinafter Statement of IBRD President Woods]. Mr. Woods' statement included the
following precise language:
[Tihe Bank's Articles provide that the Bank and its officers shall not interfere in
the political affairs of any member and that they shall not be influenced in their
decisions by the political character of the member or members concerned. Only
economic considerations are to be relevant to their decisions. Therefore, I pro-
pose to continue to treat requests for loans from these countries in the same
manner as applications from other members .... I am aware that the situation
in Africa could affect the economic development, foreign trade and finances of
Portugal and South Africa. It will therefore be necessary in reviewing the eco-
nomic condition and prospects of these countries to take account of the situa-
tion as it develops.
Id.
117. See Bleicher, supra note 113, at 33. On June 14, 1966, the World Bank granted
loans to Portuguese companies totaling US$30 million. Shortly afterward, on September
8, 1966, the Bank agreed to loan US$20 million to the South African Electricity Supply
Commission. See id.
118. See General Assembly, Official Records, Fourth Committee (21st sess.), 1653rd
mtg., Dec. 3, 1966, at 382-88 [hereinafter General Assembly Records 1966]. On Novem-
ber 28, 1966, the IBRD General Counsel appeared before a committee of the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly and argued that Article IV, Section 10 of the Bank's Charter prohibited
adherence to the U.N. resolutions.
119. For an account of such communications, see Bleicher, supra note 113, at 34-35.
120. See Statement of IBRD President Woods, supra note 116.
121. See id.
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impact upon a nation's economic relationship with the Bank.122 Second,
the Bank's statements conveyed its view that the human rights violations in
question were the "political affairs" of Portugal and South Africa and that
the Bank therefore could not use them as grounds to deny a loan or credit
line absent evidence that the violations were of sufficient economic
importance. 1
23
The IBRD policy of the 1960s was ambiguous in at least one important
sense. It was unclear whether the Bank had asserted that any meaningful
"economic consideration" trumps the political activity prohibition or
whether a weighing and balancing between "political" and "economic" fac-
tors must take place. The episodes involving Portugal and South Africa left
this issue entirely unresolved.
Since that time, the World Bank has elaborated upon its position
regarding the legality of human rights considerations in making credit
decisions. 124 The Bank's previous General Counsel, Ibrahim F.I. Shihata,
issued multiple legal opinions and internal memoranda on the subject dur-
ing his tenure, and he somewhat clarified the Bank's position. 125 However,
Shihata's opinions did not entirely resolve the ambiguity in the relation-
ship between economic and political concerns. Under Shihata's interpreta-
tion of the IBRD Articles of Agreement, the Bank apparently may consider
human rights in two instances: when such rights are of a preponderantly
economic (as opposed to political) nature or when such rights have a
"direct and obvious" effect on the economic condition of a member
nation.12
6
Shihata's modern interpretation, which represents the Bank's current
position, leaves at least two things unclear. First, the means for determin-
ing whether a human rights consideration is predominantly "political" or
"economic" is difficult to decipher. Second, the threshold level of eco-
nomic impact that a human rights violation must have to satisify the
"direct and obvious" standard, and thus trump the political activity prohi-
bition altogether, is unacceptably vague. As discussed below, the Bank's
practice has done little to cure these ambiguities.
b. Practice in the Human Rights Arena
Despite the limits imposed by its interpretation of the IBRD Articles of
Agreement, the Bank has examined human rights factors in a variety of
122. See General Assembly Records 1966, supra note 118.
123. See id.
124. The Bank's policy statements in the context of the dispute surrounding Portugal
and South Africa are quite similar to the message one gleans from former General Coun-
sel Ibrahim F.I. Shihata's 1995 memorandum. See Shihata, 1995 Memorandum, supra
note 27.
125. See id.; see generally Shihata, Issues of "Governance," supra note 27; Ibrahim F.I.
Shihata, The World Bank and Human Rights: An Analysis of the Legal Issues and the Record
of Achievements, 17 DEN. J. Ir'L L. & PoL'Y 39 (1988).
126. See Shihata, Issues of "Governance," supra note 27, at 38, 55. This formulation
was restated and refined in Shihata's 1995 memorandum discussing the political activ-
ity prohibition. See Shihata, 1995 Memorandum, supra note 27, at 29-30.
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circumstances.' 27 The first explicit recognition of human rights in a
World Bank lending decision came in 1972, when the Bank discontinued
loans to the Chilean government, citing human rights violations by the
Allende government as one of its grounds. 128 Since that time, the Bank has
broadened its involvement in the human rights sphere considerably. 12 9 By
1988, Shihata reported that the World Bank promoted a wide array of
human rights,130 including the "right to development;" 13 1 the rights to an
adequate living standard, education, and nutrition;13 2 women's rights; the
right to a healthy environment; refugees' rights; and rights related to invol-
untary resettlement.
133
To advance its more active involvement in the human rights arena, the
World Bank initiated its "good governance" program, which characterized
human rights as a vital precursor to sustainable economic development. 134
127. See Cahn, supra note 3, at 163-67. In recent years, the Bank's human rights
activities generally have been subsumed beneath the rubric of "good governance," which
has become a dominant IBRD theme in the 1990s. See id.; Stremlau & Sagasti, supra
note 11, ch. 3, '19.
128. See Reports of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the
International Development Association, and the International Finance Corporation,
1972 U.N.Y.B. 315-17.
129. See Bradlow, supra note 26, at 59. The Bank's operations, either by explicit
intent or less direct means, now have a direct effect on many types of human rights,
including, inter alia, the rights of women, resettled persons, and refugees and the rights
to due process, free speech and association, nondiscriminatory treatment, food, health
care, shelter, and integrity of the person.
For Shihata's account of the Bank's role in promoting various human rights, see gener-
ally Shihata, supra note 125, at 48-66. For a summary account of the same activities, see
Shihata, supra note 94, at 43-44.
130. See Shihata, supra note 125, at 48. Shihata has distinguished between human
rights of a "civil and political nature" and those which constitute "economic and social
rights." See id.; see also Shihata, supra note 94, at 4243.
131. See Res. No. 41/128, reprinted in 13 COMMONWEALTH L. BULL. 1013 (1987). The
"right to development" emanates from a 1986 Declaration of the U.N. General Assembly.
The first paragraph of Article I of the Declaration reads: "The right to development is an
unalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are
entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural, and politi-
cal development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully
realized." Id. Shihata asserts that the right to development, as set forth in the Declara-
tion, is "one human right which the World Bank has been promoting throughout its
history." Shihata, supra note 125, at 49.
132. Shihata addresses these rights as coterminal with the broader right to freedom
from poverty, which he asserts as a goal of IBRD development programs. Id. Such
rights emanate from, inter alia, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the U.N.
Declaration on Social Progress and Development and the Universal Declaration on the
Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition and the International Covenant, and the Procla-
mation of Teheran. Id.
133. See Shihata, supra note 125, at 54-65. According to Shihata, women's rights
emanate from sources including the Declaration of Teheran and the Declaration of Right
to Development, while environmental rights are derived from the Declaration on the
Human Environment and other sources. See generally id. The principal sources of refu-
gees' rights are the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S.
150 (1954), and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 U.N.T.S. 267
(1967). See id.
134. See Armstrong, supra note 94, at 240-41. Gathii has argued that the Bank's
"good governance" policy "serves as the World Bank's short hand for measuring which
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By 1989, the Bank published a report which specifically referred to human
rights as an essential component of "good governance." 135
Since the end of the Cold War, the IBRD has pursued a broader "devel-
opment" strategy, expanding its definition of permissible, "economic"
human rights considerations and concomitantly narrowing its definition
of prohibited, "political" human rights considerations. 136 The Bank now
regularly takes into account the rights of refugees and resettled persons in
its loan decisions and program implementation. 137 It has also taken an
increasingly active position regarding women's rights, environmental
issues, and a cluster of activities related to the rights to development and
freedom from poverty. 138
Two important conclusions may be drawn from the World Bank's
practice in the human rights arena. First, it is clear that the Bank now
envisions its development mandate as encompassing goals beyond eco-
nomic advancement. 139 The objectives of social equity and enhanced qual-
ity of life are now firmly entrenched in the Bank's conception of
"sustainable development."'140 The Bank's broader construction of its man-
date significantly influences the interpretation of the IBRD Charter by
demonstrating that the Bank's member nations have increasingly agreed
certain human rights considerations are sufficiently "economic" and
"apolitical" to be lawfully entertained in the Bank's lending decisions.
The second conclusion drawn from IBRD practice is that the precise
distinction between "economic" and "political" human rights considera-
tions remains vague.141 For example, it may be difficult to argue that
women's rights are more "economic" and less "political" in nature than the
parts of the human rights agenda are compatible or consistent with its financial and
economic mandate." James Thuo Gathii, Good Governance as a Counter Insurgency
Agenda to Oppositional and Transformative Social Projects in International Law, 5 BuFF.
HUM. RTs. L. REv. 107, 108 (1999).
135. See THE WORLD BANK GROUP, SuB-SAHARAN Auc~A FROM CIsIs TO SUSTAINABLE
GROWTH, A LONG-TERm PERSPECTIVE STUDY, 63-88 (1989). The Bank's report stated that
the rule of law, necessary for sustainable development, implies scrupulous respect for
the law and human rights at every level of governance." Id.
136. See LAvYERs COMMITTEE FOR HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 99; Bradlow, supra
note 26, at 54; see also Bradlow & Grossman, supra note 20, at 431.
137. See Shihata, 1995 Memorandum, supra note 27, at 26-27.
138. See Bradlow & Grossman, supra note 20, at 414-15; Bradlow, supra note 26, at
49.
139. See Wadrzyk, supra note 1, at 564 (asserting that there has been a "gradual incor-
poration of some human rights concepts in the Bank's definition of 'development"); see
also Bradlow, supra note 26, at 54-57.
140. See Handl, supra note 13, at 649-51 (asserting that "in practice MDBs nowadays
routinely make investment decisions based, inter alia, on sensitive 'noneconomic' con-
siderations.., and there is no denying that certain human-rights-related conditionalities
have become part and parcel of the MDBs' routine loan requirements").
141. See Shihata, Issues of "Governance," supra note 27. The Bank's current test to
determine whether a consideration is "economic" or "political" is the "direct and obvi-
ous" test. The test has three parts: the economic effect of a considered factor must be (1)
dear and unequivocal, (2) preponderant, and (3) if associated with political actions or
events, "of such impact and relevance as to make it a Bank concern." Id.
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freedom of the press.142 Thus, the Bank's practice cannot be said to pro-
vide evidence of an agreement among its member nations regarding the
proper interpretation of Article IV, Section 10. It remains unclear precisely
when certain human rights considerations breach the protected concepts
of a nation's "political affairs" or "political character." For that determina-
tion, this analysis turns to an examination of further interpretive sources.
2. Relevant Rules of International Law
To interpret the terms and provisions of a treaty, international law, as
codified in the Vienna Convention, also requires consideration of "any rele-
vant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the par-
ties."143 The applicable rules of international law, like the policy and
practice of the Bank, comprise part of the second stage in the encerclement
progressif. Although they are not part of the text of the treaty, they provide
evidence of an explicit or implicit agreement among the World Bank's
member nations to interpret the Articles of Agreement in a particular
fashion.144
Applicable rules of international law potentially affect an interpreta-
tion of the IBRD and IDA Articles of Agreement in two major ways. First,
certain principles of international law provide guidance regarding the
meaning of the concept of "political affairs" expressed in Article IV, Section
10. Thus, they help elucidate what the Bank is legally authorized to do.
Second, principles of international law dictate certain obligations of the
World Bank vis-a-vis the United Nations and other sovereign and interna-
tional entities. Such authority states what the Bank must do, regardless of
the IBRD and IDA Charters.
a. Defining the Concept of "Political Affairs"
International law provides little guidance regarding the appropriate
meaning of "influence[ I by the political character of the member" found in
Article IV, Section 10.145 It does, however, provide evidence of the proper
significance of "interfer[ence] in [a country's] political affairs,"'146 thereby
addressing the other major prohibition left obscure by an ordinary mean-
ing textual analysis.
Although no resolute definition of the term "political" exists under
international law, both the U.N. Charter and the preexisting Covenant of
the League of Nations provide evidence that the narrower concept of a
country's "political affairs" is closely tied to traditional notions of sovereign
142. See Bradlow, supra note 26, at 61. Bradlow cites the Bank's determination that
female genital mutilation is an "economic" issue as an example of the ambiguity in the
Bank's treatment of human rights. See id.
143. Vienna Convention, supra note 44, art. 31(3)(c).
144. See de Ar&haga, supra note 48, at 44.
145. IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 16, art. IV, § 10.
146. Id.
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autonomy.14 7 Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter prohibits the United
Nations from intervening "in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction" of any member state. 14 8 Similarly, Article 15(8) of
the Covenant of the League of Nations prohibits the League from interfer-
ing in a member State's "domestic jurisdiction."1 4 9 While the IBRD Char-
ter makes no explicit reference to a state's "domestic jurisdiction," it does
refer to the "political affairs of any member."'50 This suggests that the
affairs contemplated are those of an individual sovereign member, either in
its domestic capacity or in its singular relationship with other States,
which are not subjects of concern for the international community as a
whole.1
5 '
Evidence that international law defines "political affairs" as acts
within a sovereign sphere is of great consequence to the treatment of
human rights under the IBRD Charter because it is now well-established
that violations of certain human rights fall beyond a State's autonomous
jurisdiction.15 2 Such rights represent obligations of an individual State to
the international community as a whole; they have been deliberately
excerpted from the State's sovereign power and consequently cannot be the
subject of its "political affairs."
15 3
The principle that certain human rights norms constitute obligations
to the international community and thus transcend domestic jurisdiction
arises from a landmark holding of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
In Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. Ltd., the ICJ held that a State bears
certain obligations, including the protection of "the basic rights of the
human person," to the entire international community; such obligations
147. See Bradlow & Grossman, supra note 20, at 415 n.18; Marmorstein, supra note 2,
at 123-24.
148. U.N. CHARmn art. 2, para. 7.
149. See LEAGUE oF NATIONS CovENANT, art. 15(8).
150. IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 16, art. IV, § 10 (emphasis added).
151. See Marmorstein, supra note 2, at 126.
The transcript of the U.N. response to the IBRD in the dispute surrounding Portugal and
South Africa reveals the same basic argument. It paraphrased the response of the U.N.
legal counsel as follows:
The first sentence of Section 10 would appear to have as its purpose the prohibi-
tion of interference in the internal political affairs of a member state and of
discrimination against a State because of the political character of its Govern-
ment. [The U.N. legal counsel] doubted very much that the sentence was
intended to relate to criteria involving the international conduct of a State affect-
ing its fundamental Charter obligations.
21 U.N. GAOR 4-20, U.N. Doc. A/C 4 SR 1653 (prov. ed. 1966), reprinted in 6 INT'L
LEGAL MArmRLms 171, 172 (1967).
152. See Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, 1923 P.C.IJ. (ser.B) No.4.
The principle that international legal obligations override sovereign jurisdictional inter-
ests was set forth in this decision by the Permanent Court of InternationalJustice (PCIJ),
the predecessor to the ICJ.
153. See Philip Alston, Environment, Economic Development and Human Rights: A Tri-
angular Relationship?, Remarks, Apr. 20-23, 1988, reprinted in 82 Am. Soc'y INTL. L.
PROc. 40, 54 (1988). Alston has made this contention, asserting that "human rights are
not political, they are matters of international law." Id.
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are erga omnes.154 The Court added that some erga omnes obligations
arise from "international instruments of a universal or quasi-universal
character," while others "have entered into the body of general interna-
tional law." 15
5
Shortly after its decision in Barcelona Traction, in an advisory opinion
on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Reso-
lution 276,156 the ICJ asserted that a violation of "fundamental human
rights" constitutes a breach of a State's obligations under the U.N. Char-
ter.157 In the Namibia case, the "fundamental human rights violations" at
issue concerned racial discrimination by South Africa during the
apartheid regime.158
In the years since the Barcelona Traction and Namibia decisions, the
long-debated concept of jus cogens, similar to "violations erga omnes," has
been explicitly recognized in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention, enlarg-
ing the window through which international organizations can scrutinize
the human rights offenses of sovereign States. 159 More than ever before,
violations of fundamental human rights now may confidently be treated as
matters that transcend sovereign authority and lie beyond the boundary of
a nation's autonomous will.160 Thus, the IBRD and IDA Articles of Agree-
ment cannot prohibit the Bank's consideration of such fundamental
human rights abuses as intrusions upon a nation's protected "political
154. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.Cj. 3, 33
(Feb. 5). The International Court of Justice held as follows:
An essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State
towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-a-vis
another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the for-
mer are the concern of all states. In view of the importance of the rights
involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they
are obligations erga omnes.
Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from
the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles
and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection
from slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of
protection have entered into the body of international law ... ; others are con-
ferred by international instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character.
Id.
155. Id.
156. 1971 I.Cj. 50 [hereinafter Namibia]. The ICJ's advisory opinion was requested
by the U.N. Security Council. See HENKIN Er AL., supra note 46, at 856.
157. See Namibia, supra note 156, at 50.
158. See id.
159. See Vienna Convention, supra note 44, art. 53.
160. See HENKIN Er A .., supra note 46, at 599-619; Patricia Armstrong, Discussion, 88
Am. SoC'Y Ifrr'L L. PROC. 271, 288 (1994). There is obviously substantial debate regard-
ing what human rights may be regarded as fundamental. However, it is well established
at international law that the so-called "International Bill of Rights," comprised of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights (together with its Optional Protocol), and the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, sets forth human rights fairly established as
"fundamental" under international law. See id.
Vol. 33
2000 Human Rights Criteria
affairs." 161
b. Rules Binding Upon the IBRD
The second means by which the rules of international law could affect
an interpretation of the IBRD Articles of Agreement is by obligating the
Bank to consider, or abstain from considering, human rights factors in cer-
tain cases. The World Bank has a unique status at international law. It is
not a signatory to the U.N. Charter and is technically an independent, spe-
cialized agency of the United Nations pursuant to a 1947 agreement
between the two organizations. 162 That agreement requires the Bank to
consult and cooperate with other international organizations on matters of
mutual interest 16 3 and to conduct its affairs with "due regard for decisions
of the Security Council under Articles 41 and 42 of the United Nations
Charter."'164 However, it also states that "[t]he United Nations recognizes
that the action to be taken by the Bank on any loan is a matter to be deter-
mined by the independent exercise of the Bank's own judgment in accor-
161. Whether certain human rights considerations would constitute prohibited influ-
ence due to a member's "political character" is not as clear from the relevant rules of
international law. That inquiry must be resolved below by reference to the Articles'
travaux prdparatoires. See infra Part II.C.
162. See Agreement between the United Nations and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, Nov. 15, 1947, 16 U.N.T.S. 346, reprinted in 2 INT'L
ORGANIZATION 198-201 (1948) [hereinafter Relationship Agreement]. Article 1(2) of that
agreement states: "The Bank is a specialized agency established by agreement among its
member Governments and having wide international responsibilities, as defined in its
Articles of Agreement. . . ." Id. The IDA is also a specialized agency pursuant to a
similar agreement. See Agreement between the United Nations and the International
Development Association, G.A. Res. 1594, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16A, at 17.
For a brief discussion of the relationship between the World Bank and the United
Nations, see Jane Dwasi, Kenya: A Study in International Labor Standards and Their Effect
on Working Women in Developing Countries: The Case for Integration of Enforcement Issues
in the World Bank's Policies, 17 Wis. INT'L J. 347, 438 (1999).
163. See Article IV(1)-(3) of the Relationship Agreement, supra note 162, which sets
forth the general relationship between the Bank and other international organizations:
(1) The United Nations and the Bank shall consult together and exchange views
on matters of mutual interest.
(2) Neither organization nor any of their subsidiary bodies will present any for-
mal recommendations to the other without reasonable prior consultation with
regard there to. Any formal recommendations made by either organization after
such consultation will be considered as soon as possible by the appropriate
organ of the other.
(3) The United Nations recognizes that the action to be taken by the Bank of any
loan is a matter to be determined by the independent exercise of the Bank's own
judgement in accordance with the Bank's Articles of Agreement. The United
Nations recognizes therefore, that it would be sound policy to refrain from mak-
ing recommendations to the Bank with respect to particular loans or with
respect to terms or conditions of financing by the Bank. The Bank recognizes
that the United Nations and its organs may appropriately make recommenda-
tions with respect to the technical aspects of reconstruction or development
plans, programs or projects.
Id. However, the Relationship Agreement specifically provides that the Bank is required
to function as an independent organization relative to the United Nations. See LAW.YERs
COMMITEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 26 n.68.
164. Relationship Agreement, supra note 162, at art. VI(I).
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dance with the Bank's Articles of Agreement." 165 It is therefore clear that
General Assembly resolutions are not binding on the IBRD, 166 and it
appears from the language of the UN-IBRD Relationship Agreement that
even Security Council decisions do not create absolute obligations on the
World Bank.
1 6 7
Various arguments in the literature have advanced the thesis that inter-
national law provides binding norms for the Bank in the human rights
arena. 16 8 Some have argued that, as a specialized agency of the United
Nations, the Bank is obligated to foster compliance with international
human rights law, 169 an explicit object of the U.N. Charter. 170 Others
have countered that consideration of human rights factors amounts to coer-
cion prohibited under the U.N. Charter' 7 ' and violates the principle of
sovereignty.1
72
While such arguments may serve valuable rhetorical functions in
determining what the Bank should do in the human rights arena, neither is
an accurate statement of what the Bank is obligated to do. First, it is clear
from the Relationship Agreement that the Bank is not bound to promote
the principles of the U.N. Charter or the legal principles derived from it. 1 7 3
Second, the International Court of Justice has held that economic interven-
tion does not constitute coercion prohibited by customary international
law. 17 4 Finally, the foregoing discussion of erga omnes obligations and jus
cogens norms has shown that certain human rights norms penetrate the
165. Id.
166. See Shihata, 1995 Memorandum, supra note 27, at 33. The South African and
Portugal loan controversies are examples of the non-binding quality of General Assembly
resolutions, which are "normally deemed to be recommendations." Id.
167. See LAwYERs COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 27 ("In practice,
political reality governs the relationship between the World Bank and the UN in the
human rights area.").
168. See Bradlow & Grossman, supra note 20, at 427 (citing Reparations for Injuries
Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.CJ. 174, 179 (Apr. 11); IAN BROWN-
LIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 679-707 (4th ed. 1990)). Bradlow and
Grossman assert that international organizations, such as the World Bank, are subjects
of international law bound by its norms. Therefore, they argue that the Bank cannot
provide funds to a nation practicing genocide or otherwise violating human rights
norms. See id; see also Bradlow, supra note 26, at 63. For an additional view on the
bindingness of international human rights norms on the IBRD and other multilateral
development banks (MDBs), see Handl, supra note 13, at 654-55, 662-64 (arguing that
the Bank and other MDBs need to recognize an affirmative duty to act in support of
emerging norms of the international law of sustainable development.).
169. See, e.g., Marmorstein, supra note 2, at 130-31.
170. See U.N. CHARTER art. 55. Article 55 of the U.N. Charter provides that "the
United Nations shall promote.., universal respect for, and observance of, human rights
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or relig-
ion." Id.
171. See Moris, supra note 2, at 183.
172. See id. at 184.
173. See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
174. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 4, 126 Uune
27). In the celebrated Nicaragua case, the I.CJ. held that it was "unable to regard such
action as is here complained of (cessation of economic aid) as a breach of customary
international law." Id.
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protected sovereign sphere. 175
It remains probable that Security Council resolutions could create
binding obligations upon the World Bank in certain cases.' 76 However, no
such obligation currently exists, and the literature does not identify any
relevant Security Council resolution in the Bank's history. Therefore, the
only feasible way to incorporate the resolutions of the Security Council
into an interpretation of the IBRD Charter is to acknowledge that, in lim-
ited cases, there may be mandates which trump the normal parameters set
by the Bank's Articles of Agreement. Those mandates must be assessed on
a case-by-case basis and are not sufficiently predictable to influence the
present analysis.
C. Travaux Pr~paratoires
As described above, the interpretive process set forth in the Vienna
Convention requires consideration of both the text of the IBRD Articles of
Agreement and the travaux prdparatoires leading to their formation.177 An
analysis of the preparatory work of the IBRD Charter is critical to under-
standing the intent of the Bretton Woods parties and, therefore, to an accu-
rate interpretation of the IBRD Charter's provisions. Most importantly, it
provides evidence regarding the meaning of a nation's "political character,"
the major interpretive issue left unresolved by the preceding analyses.
The Bretton Woods institutions were conceived in the midst of the Sec-
ond World War and were largely negotiated by representatives from two
nations: the United States and Great Britain. 178 The geopolitical
175. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
176. See Shihata, 1995 Memorandum, supra note 27, at 32. Shihata properly asserts
that "situations may arise where the Bank becomes legally bound to pay due regard to
factors which are basically political in nature. Members of the Bank which are also
members of the U.N. are required by the U.N. Charter (Article 48) to carry out Security
Council decisions 'directly and through their action in the appropriate international
agencies of which they are members.'" Id. It remains uncertain when a Security Coun-
cil resolution would take on binding force.
177. See de Ar~chaga, supra note 48, at 47-48. De Ar6chaga asserts that, in the legal
process of treaty interpretation, "the importance of travaux preparatoires is not to be
underestimated and their relevance is difficult to deny, since the question [of] whether a
text can be said to be clear is in some degree subjective." Id. at 48. For a discussion of
the role of travaux pr~paratoires, see supra Part I. See also supra notes 61-63 and accom-
panying text.
• 178. It is beyond dispute that the United States and Great Britain dominated both the
preparation of the Bretton Woods Institutions and the Conference itself. For an in-depth
account of the relationship between the United States and United Kingdom throughout
the 1940s, see generally RICHARD N. GARDNER, STERLING-DOLLAR DILOMACY (2d. ed.
1969). Several other books have been written on the subject of Anglo-American rela-
tions leading to Bretton Woods. For three of the most valuable sources drawn on for the
present analysis, see generally ARMAND VAN DORMAEL, BRErON WOODS: BIRTH OF A MONE-
TARY SYSTEM (1978); EDWARD S. MASON & ROBERT E. ASHER, THE WORLD BANK SINCE BET-
TON WOODS (1973); and ROBERT OLIVER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC Co-OPERATION AND
THE WORLD BANK (1975).
Perhaps surprisingly, the third most important nation in the creation of the Bretton
Woods institutions was Canada, which mediated between the U.S. and U.K. delegations
at the Conference. See Introduction to BRETTON WOODS REVISITED: EvALuATiONS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND
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destabilization during the war placed the United States and United King-
dom in positions of particular leverage for the planning and construction
of a new postwar international order. 179 France, which remained occupied
by Germany through 1943 and well into 1944, was not engaged in the
planning for Bretton Woods and played only a marginal role in the Confer-
ence itself. 80 The Axis Powers - Germany, Italy, and Japan - were
excluded altogether for obvious political reasons.,, For different political
reasons, the Soviet Union was likewise uninvolved in the negotiations lead-
ing to Bretton Woods.18 2 Although a Soviet delegation did attend the latter
stages of the Conference, its role was largely observatory, and the Soviet
Union ultimately elected not to sign the Bretton Woods agreements.' 8 3
Thus, as a consequence of such geopolitical factors, both the planning for
the Bretton Woods institutions and the .Conference itself were thoroughly
dominated by British and American visions for a postwar economic
order.184
Great Britain and the United States both envisioned the need for pow-
erful international economic institutions, which would solidify peace by
stabilizing currencies, financing certain balance-of-payments deficits, and
otherwise averting international monetary and fiscal crises.185 Neverthe-
less, the U.S. and U.K. blueprints for international economic bodies were
often discordant,' 8 6 and the two allies engaged in substantial negotiation
between 1941 and 1945, when the Bretton Woods agreements were signed
into force.' 8 7 Those negotiations provide the clearest evidence of the
DEVELOPMENT (A.L.K. Acheson et al. eds., 1972) [hereinafter BRErON WOODS REvIsITED];
Richard N. Gardner, The Political Setting, in BRETrON WOODS REVISITED [hereinafter Gard-
ner, The Political Setting], supra, at 20.
179. See Gardner, supra note 178.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. For an excellent account of the proceedings and the roles played by various
nations at Bretton Woods, see generally BRErTON WOODS REVISITED, supra note 178. The
historical literature does not provide a clear account as to why the Soviet Union played
so little a role in the negotiations. Nevertheless, it is undisputed in the literature that the
Russian delegation took a very minimal role in the proceedings.
183. See Gardner, supra note 178, at 20.
184. See LAwYERs COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 4. The dominance
of the United States and Britain in the framing of the IBRD Articles of Agreement is very
well documented. See, e.g., MASON & ASHER, supra note 178, at 28; Gardner, supra note
178, at 26.
185. For detailed discussions of the various motives that impelled the leading parties
to create the World Bank and the IMF, see generally VAN DoRMAEI, supra note 178; GARD-
NER, supra note 178; OLIVER, supra note 178. These motivations are relatively undisputed
in the literature and formed the stated goals of the Bretton Woods Conference.
186. See, e.g., GARDNER, supra note 178; MASON & ASHER, supra note 178. Excellent
analysis of the broader negotiations between the United States and United Kingdom are
set out in a number of sources. An important element of their discord was that the
British argued against all political interference with the international financial institu-
tions, while the Americans contended that economic factors could not always trump
political considerations. See Introduction to BRETON WOODS REVISITED, supra note 178,
at 20.
187. See Yokota, supra note 43, at 42-48. Henry Bittermann describes the overall pro-
cess of negotiation for the World Bank as comprising four phases: "(1) U.S. interdepart-
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intent of the drafting parties at Bretton Woods' 8 8 and thus form the sub-
ject of the ensuing discussion.
The leaders of the U.K. and U.S. delegations, and the principal archi-
tects of the Bretton Woods institutions, were the eminent English econo-
mist John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White of the U.S. Treasury
Department.1 8 9 In September 1941, Keynes produced a draft for an "inter-
national Clearing Union," which became the predecessor to the IMF.190
By the end of 1941, White had also drafted a plan, comprising a "United
and Associated Nations Stabilization Fund" and a "Bank for Reconstruc-
tion of the United and Associated Nations,"' 9 1 which would eventually
become the World Bank
Interestingly, in its first iteration, White's plan contained no political
activity prohibition;' 92 rather, Keynes's Clearing Union plan introduced
the concept:
(a) the Clearing Union should be able to accommodate countries with differ-
ent principles of government and different economic policies,
(b) its operations should involve the least possible interference with national
policies, and
(c) its management must be genuinely international without preponderant
power of veto or enforcement to any country or group; and the rights and
privileges of the smaller countries must be safeguarded.'
93
Conversely, the purposes for the Bank set forth in White's plan include two
objectives with an expressly political character, clearly demonstrating that
White, at least according to his initial conception, had no intention that the
Bank would be non-political:'
94
9. To make easier the solution of many of the economic and political
problems that will confront the 'peace conference.'
mental discussion (1941-43); (2) informal intergovernmental discussion of the
Treasury's 'Preliminary Draft Outline,' November 24, 1943; (3) the Atlantic City Meeting
of the Agenda Committee, June, 1944; and (4) the Bretton Woods Conference, July
1944." Henry Bittermann, Negotiation of the Articles of Agreement of the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 5 IN-r'L LAW. 59, 60 (1971). It will become
clear in the course of the ensuing discussion that the critical negotiations of the political
activity prohibition occurred in the second of Bittermann's four phases. See infra Part
II.C.
188. See Yokota, supra note 43, at 42-48.
189. See Kneller, supra note 2, at 395. The dominant roles played by Keynes and
White have been chronicled in numerous historical accounts of the negotiations and in
biographies of both men. See, e.g., R.F. HARROD, THE LIFE Of JOHN MAYNARD KEYNS 575-
85 (1951); DAviD REES, HARRY DEXT WHITE: A STUDY IN PARADox 232-35 (1973).
190. See Keynes' September 1941 Plan for an International Clearing Union, reprinted
in THE NEV ECONOMICS: KEYNES' INFLUENCE ON THEORY AND PUBLIC PoLIcY 32341 (S.
Harris ed., 1947).
191. See Bittermann, supra note 187, at 62. White's plan was drafted in response to a
request by Secretary Morganthau on December 14, 1941. See id.
192. See Yokota, supra note 43, at 42.
193. THE NEw ECONOMICS, supra note 190, at 324-25.
194. See Yokota, supra note 43, at 42.
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10. To enhance the opportunity throughout the world for a healthy develop-
ment of democratic institutions.
19 5
In comparing the initial drafts of Keynes and White, one finds the first
evidence that the notion of political impartiality had its origin with Keynes
and the British delegation.
By August 1942, White was familiar with the contents of Keynes's plan
for a "Clearing Union."'1 96 Throughout 1943, informal discussions and
negotiations took place between the British government and U.S. authori-
ties. 197 As a result of those negotiations, White's plan for the Bank was
amended several times. 198 In November 1943, his revised plan formed the
basis for the U.S. Treasury Department's first official proposal for a "Bank
for Reconstruction and Development of the United and Associated
Nations."1 99 During the process of negotiating with the British, the Bank's
two political purposes were eliminated and the following predecessor to
Article IV, Section 10 was added:
The Bank and its officers shall scrupulously avoid interference in the politi-
cal affairs of any member country. This provision shall not limit the right of
an officer of the Bank to participate in the political life of his own country.
The Bank shall not be influenced in its decisions with respect to application
for loans by the political character of the government of the country request-
ing a loan.
200
Before the delegations convened at Bretton Woods in 1944, language stat-
ing that "only economic considerations shall be relevant to the Bank's deci-
sions" was added to the provision, presumably by the British, who
substantially rewrote Article IV prior to the conference. 20 1
Though not dispositive, the circumstantial evidence that Keynes and
the U.K. contingent were the source of the political activity prohibition is
certainly strong. However, the British motivations underlying the provi-
195. Harry D. White, Appendix D: Suggested Plan for a United and Associated Nations
Stabilization Fund and a Bank for Reconstruction and Development of the United and Asso-
ciated Nations, reprinted in OLIVER, supra note 178, at 291.
196. See Kneller, supra note 2, at 397.
197. There is no official account of the negotiations that took place between the
United States and United Kingdom during the period between August 1942 and Novem-
ber 1943. Therefore, the best evidence of the content of the negotiations is obtained by
examining the resulting changes to the drafts of Keynes and White.
During the informal negotiations between the United States and Great Britain, the
inchoate plans for the Bank were mentioned incidentally in discussion with China, vari-
ous Latin American countries, and some European nations, including the Soviet Union.
However, the Bank proposal was not given to any of those nations until late in 1943,
after the political activity prohibition was added. See Bittermann, supra note 187, at 63.
Thus, it is quite clear that the political activity prohibition was not included at the direct
insistence of any of those nations.
198. See Yokota, supra note 43, at 42.
199. See Kneller, supra note 2, at 397. The U.S. Treasury draft for the Bank was pub-
lished and disseminated on November 23, 1943. See Bittermann, supra note 187, at 63.
200. U.S. Treasury Dep't, Preliminary Draft Outline of a Proposal for a Bank for
Reconstruction and Development of the United and Associated Nations, art. IV, sec. 19
(Nov. 24, 1943).
201. See OLIVER, supra note 178, at 174-81.
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sion are less evident. Although Congressional hearings and other political
fora touched on the subject, neither Keynes nor any member of the British
delegation provided any public speech or memorandum definitively
explaining the U.K. position.202 At the Bretton Woods proceedings them-
selves, there was virtually no mention of Article IV, Section 10,203 which
underwent only moderate amendment in committee and was adopted
unanimously by the parties to the treaty.
20 4
Although the historical records of the IBRD Charter's travaux
prCparatoires offer little explicit evidence of the drafters' intent of the, three
principal rationales have been put forth in the academic literature. First,
Mason and Asher assert that Article IV, Section 10 was included "with the
Soviet Union principally in mind."2" 5 It is quite reasonable to believe that
the Soviet Union weighed heavily on the minds of the American and British
drafters in framing the political activity provision. 20 6 In 1943, the Soviet
Union ranked with the United States and United Kingdom in an Allied
triumvirate that stood to divide much of the political world at war's end.
Russia would also command important economic power, and securing its
participation was undoubtedly an objective of the negotiators at Bretton
Woods.20 7 The Soviet Union was the nation most apt to oppose an interna-
tional financial institution which might discriminate against nations on the
basis of their "political character."20 8 Levinson has argued that the tripolar
202. See Levinson, supra note 7, at A23 ("There is no definitive statement as to what
the authors [Keynes and White] intended, more than 50 years ago, by their use of the
term 'political.' Congressional hearings at the time simply indicated a concern that
decisions on particular laws not be influenced by 'political' favoritism.").
203. See generally Proceedings and Documents of the United Nations Monetary and
Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1-22, 1944 (U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1948).
204. Id.
205. MASON & ASHER, supra note 178, at 27. The same assertion has been made by
James Paul. See James C.N. Paul, The World Bank, Human Rights and Development: Some
Obligations, Paper for the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Association of African Studies
(1987), at 3-5. The authority and basis for Paul's assertion is likewise unclear.
206. See Bittermann, supra note 187, at 79 (asserting that the relevant provisions
"were probably intended principally as assurances to the U.S.S.R."). Although the politi-
cal activity prohibition may have been inserted with the Soviet Union in mind, it is quite
clear that its inclusion was not specifically requested by the Russian delegation. Oliver
writes that negotiations between the U.S. and Soviet delegations regarding the Bretton
Woods proposals did not begin until the spring of 1944, after the relevant language had
already been added. See OLrVER, supra note 178, at 163-66; see also Yokota, supra note
43, at 43.
207. See Untitled Transcript of Harry Dexter White (Nov. 30, 1945), reprinted in
GARDNER, supra note 178, at 7 [hereinafter White Transcript]; see also Yokota, supra note
43, at 43. As Harry White wrote in 1945:
The major task that confronts American diplomacy-and the only task that has
any real value in the major problems that confront us-is to devise a means
whereby continued peace and friendly relations can be assured between the
United States and Russia. Everything else in the field of international diplo-
macy pales into insignificance beside this major task. It matters little what our
political relationships with England become or what happens in the Balkans or
the Far East if the problems between the United States and Russia can be solved.
White Transcript, supra, at 7.
208. See Yokota, supra note 43, at 43.
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ideological tension between communist Russia, socialist Britain, and capi-
talist America likely motivated the parties to include a political activity
prohibition.
20 9
Despite the appeal of the foregoing rationale, it remains inferential.
Mason and Asher provide no authority for their assertion,2 10 and the major
historical accounts do not emphasize concern for the Soviet Union as a
driving force behind the adoption of Article IV, Section 10.211 Rather, the
historical accounts provide evidence that Britain's concern for postwar eco-
nomic sovereignty was the most influential reason behind the inclusion of
the political activity prohibition.
2 12
It is well documented that Keynes and other members of the British
delegation sought in the course of negotiations to preserve liberal credit for
the United Kingdom after the war.21 3 Historical accounts provide evidence
that the British deemed economic sovereignty vis-i-vis the dominant
United States essential to avoid dismantling of the "sterling area," the pref-
erential economic zone of the British Empire. 2 14 Britain was wary of the
American domination of international financial organizations and feared
that pressure would be applied to weaken or abolish its preferred trading
relationships. 2 15 Therefore, it appears that Keynes may have added the
political activity prohibition as insulation for Britain against American eco-
nomic dominance or anti-Commonwealth bias.
Kneller offers a third argument, supplementing his contention that
Keynes sought primarily to insulate Britain's economic sovereignty. He
argues that Keynes added the provision due to his broader concern that
political manipulation would detrimentally impact the Bretton Woods
institutions.2 16 While the American delegation believed that international
economics could not be separated completely from politics, 2 17 Keynes
envisioned the most effective financial institutions as highly technical and
209. See Levinson, supra note 7, at A23 ("Postwar political competition in individual
countries would exist between conservative, liberal and socialist parties. It certainly
was reasonable to ensure that the Bretton Woods institutions not take sides in this politi-
cal competition. And that is what the 'political' sections of the Articles of Agreement
should be understood to prohibit.").
210. See MASON & ASHER, supra note 178, at 27. Mason and Asher do not cite to any
document which supports their assertion.
211. See Bittermann, supra note 187; Gardner, supra note 178; OLIVER, supra note 178.
The major accounts of the negotiations, including those of Bittermann, Gardner, and
Oliver, provide little suggestion that the Soviet Union was the reason for the political
activity prohibition.
212. See Kneller, supra note 2, at 395, 398.
213. See Gardner, supra note 178, at 26; Kneller, supra note 2, at 398.
214. See Gardner, supra note 178, at 26.
215. See GARDNER, supra note 178, at 18. The British fear of American dominance and
the dismantling of the "sterling area" appear to have been well-founded, as the United
States advocated anti-discrimination in trading practices, especially "preferential prac-
tices in the British Empire." Id. Gardner adds that "[s]ome of the most influential post-
war planners were deeply suspicious of the United Kingdom." Id. at 7.
216. See Kneller, supra note 2, at 398; see also C. PAYER, THE WORLD BANK: A CmncA.
ANA.YSIS 23 (1982). It appears that some American leaders shared this view. See GARD-
NER, supra note 178, at 265.
217. See Kneller, supra note 2, at 402.
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immune to political influence.2 18 Kneller reasons that if Keynes were prin-
cipally concerned with Britain and economic sovereignty, a political activ-
ity prohibition would also appear in the charter of the IMF, which was
presumed to exercise greater power over economic policy than the Bank.2 19
Yokota offers another explanation for the inclusion of the political
activity prohibition in the IBRD Charter and its removal from the IMF Arti-
cles of Agreement. Yokota argues that the United States, as the dominant
party to the negotiations, insisted that the provision be removed from the
IMF charter.2 20 However, in order to warm the British to the idea of the
World Bank, which the United Kingdom initially rejected, White elected to
accept the provision in the IBRD Articles.
2 21
Though the precise intent of the parties remains difficult to ascertain,
the drafters of the IBRD Charter were undoubtedly cognizant of all of the
foregoing concerns when they negotiated the political activity prohibition.
It is therefore likely that some combination of these factors drove the nego-
tiations,222 and while it is impossible to prove that they represent the com-
plete constellation of motives for Article IV, Section 10, the literature
identifies them as the chief probable sources of inspiration. For purposes
of the present inquiry, the critical determination is whether the Bank's
review of a prospective borrower's human rights record would frustrate any
of the three principal motives for the political activity prohibition.
An intent to appease the Soviet Union represents the first likely con-
sideration in the 1943 negotiations between the United States and United
Kingdom. 22 3 To the extent that this assertion is correct and Article IV,
Section 10 was included with the Soviet Union principally in mind, the
obvious concern addressed was a possible Bank bias against Commu-
nism.2 24 That concern suggests a relatively narrow intent on the part of
the drafters to avoid biases against a member nation based on its political
form or ideology - Capitalist, Socialist, or Communist.2 25 Given the geo-
political backdrop to the 1943 negotiations, such an intent is highly plausi-
ble, as British and American leaders already anticipated the postwar
218. See id. at 398; PAYER, supra note 216, at 23.
219. See Kneller, supra note 2, at 398-99 n.146.
220. See Yokota, supra note 43, at 45.
221. See id. at 45-46.
222. While no previous author has made this assertion, a cumulative reading of the
historical sources suggests that each of the three factors discussed may have played a
role in the ultimate decision to include the political activity prohibition. It is quite clear
from the historical analysis that all three factors - the Soviet concern, the British desire
to protect spheres of economic influence, and the more functional concerns of John
Maynard Keynes - were in the minds of key British and American negotiators at Bretton
Woods.
223. See supra notes 205-11 and accompanying text (demonstrating that this explana-
tion has been set forth by Bittermann, Mason and Asher, and Paul).
224. See id.
225. This argument - that the IBRD Articles of Agreement contemplate "political
character" as a nation's form of governance (Communist, Socialist, Capitalist) - was
advanced by the U.N. legal counsel in the context of the South Africa and Portugal loan
controversies. See 21 UN GAOR 4-20, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR 1653 (prov. ed. 1966),
reprinted in 6 rr'L LEGAL MATERIAs 171, 172 (1967).
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polarization between Capitalism and Communism, which would give rise
to the Cold War.
2 26
If the architects of the World Bank simply intended to protect member
nations from biases against Communism or Socialism, the scope of a
nation's protected "political character" would be narrow. It would allow a
country to select a national ideology and form of governance, but it would
not permit unbridled flaunting of international legal norms. 22 7 Violations
of international human rights law are not inherently tied to any particular
form of governance, and intervention taken to protect such rights would
not necessarily have a disproportionate impact upon Communist, Social-
ist, or Capitalist countries. 22 8 Therefore, to the extent that concern for the
Soviet Union drove the inclusion of the political activity prohibition, the
drafters did not intend to protect nations from the adverse consequences of
human rights violations.
The second suggested motive for Article IV, Section 10, which reso-
nates with the historical accounts of the negotiations, was Keynes' concern
for the protection of Britain's postwar economic sovereignty and Common-
wealth ties.2 29 This intent, like that to appease the Soviet Union, contem-
plates a definition of "political" activity that does not preclude human
rights considerations. 230 The postwar economic sovereignty sought by the
British was related to fiscal and monetary policies and preferential trade
relationships. 2 3 ' The literature provides evidence that Britain was appre-
hensive of future restrictions upon its economic freedom. 23 2 This British
concern suggests that the form of "political" insulation contemplated in
226. See LAwYERs COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 17; Armstrong,
supra note 94, at 240; Bittermann, supra note 187, at 79. The argument that the political
activity prohibition was designed to prevent the World Bank from developing an anti-
Communist bias has enjoyed some support in the literature. Inferential support can also
be found in the writings of Harry Dexter White. See supra note 207.
227. See Address by Henry Morgenthau, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Bank-
ing and Currency, 1945, cited in GARDNER, STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY, supra note 178,
at 11. As Morgenthau said in a 1945 address to the Senate Banking and Currency Com-
mittee, the object of creating "political Bretton Woods institutions was so that countries
could come to a world bank or a world fund without having to sell their political souls."
Id. It is difficult to argue that forcing a nation to comply with international human
rights norms would represent a sale of that nation's "political soul."
228. One could argue that an empirical difference in the human rights standards
among Capitalist, Socialist and Communist nations has been evident in the years since
the Bretton Woods institutions were created. Even if an empirical study were to support
that assertion, there is no obvious inherent disposition in any of such systems to abuse
human rights (and thus to suffer disproportionately from sanctions related to human
rights abuses).
229. See Introduction to GARDNER, supra note 178, at xlii. This apprehension was
apparently justified. "In the wartime years many American leaders regarded the British
Empire as a major obstacle to the achievement of postwar U.S. goals. On the British
side, there was a widespread resentment of the rise of American power and of what
looked like a misguided and indiscriminate 'anti-colonialism.'" Id.
230. Clearly, the desire to protect preferential trade relationships and, more generally,
economic sovereignty does not lead to an interpretation which would insulate human
rights abuses from the Bank's purview.
231. See Kneller, supra note 2, at 398.
232. See Gardner, supra note 178, at 25-27.
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the IBRD Charter was narrowly focused upon economic policy. 233 Thus,
the British desire to preserve economic sovereignty does not imply a desire
to protect a sovereign's autonomy regarding human rights considerations.
A final, and relatively undisputed, factor during the 1943 negotiations
was Keynes' belief that the Bretton Woods institutions would be most effec-
tive if operated by expert economists under conditions of minimal political
influence.23 4 The rationale for this belief was that decisions would be
based on rigorous economic analysis alone. The essential determination
would be whether a member nation would be able to pay back its loan.
Under Keynes' view, political factors could be considered only when they
had direct economic effects upon the transaction or program at hand.23 5
His intent was not to construct an artificial separation between "economic"
and "political" factors, but to assert that only the economic aspect of any
consideration be relevant. This intention leaves the door open to human
rights considerations whenever they legitimately affect economic perform-
ance or ability to repay Bank obligations.
Thus, based upon the available literature, it appears that three major
factors drove the inclusion of the political activity prohibition in the IBRD
Articles of Agreement. Precisely how much each of those factors influ-
enced the travaux prdparatoires may never be ascertained, and it is possible
that one or two of the three suggested motives was dominant. Fortunately,
the weight each of the three factors is immaterial to the present analysis.
The important conclusion to be drawn from the travaux pr paratoires is
that none of the three apparent objectives for Article IV, Section 10 leads to
an interpretation of a nation's "political character" that would prohibit the
Bank from considering a nation's violation of internationally recognized
human rights in its lending and credit decisions.23 6 Therefore, while the
exact history at Bretton Woods remains somewhat shrouded, the available
evidence suffices for purposes of the present analysis.
Conclusions
The preceding analysis has been devoted to a relatively narrow
inquiry: precisely when may the World Bank lawfully consider a nation's
human rights record in its lending and credit decisions? Although this
233. See id.
234. See GARDNER, supra note 178, at 81. Keynes' first draft for an international Clear-
ing Union had proposed that it have a "purely technical and non-political character" or
an "'anonymous' and 'impersonal' quality." Id.
235. See Kneller, supra note 2, at 396-99.
236. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 7, at A23. Levinson agrees that none of the possi-
ble motives for the political activity prohibition would exclude human rights considera-
tions. He argues that:
In order to accept such an expanded interpretation of the "political" provisions,
we have to believe that Keynes and White, at the time the war against Nazi Ger-
many was still going on, intended to provide a cover that would permit the Bret-
ton Woods institutions to provide financing in the future for governments that,
like the Nazis if on a lesser scale, were egregious abusers of human rights. Such
an interpretation defies reason and common sense.
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question ultimately will be answered by the Bank itself,2 37 this article has
presented arguments to guide that interpretation and steer the Bank
towards the proper legal conclusion. 238
Through application of the interpretive methodology established
under customary international law and set forth in the Vienna Conven-
tion,239 the foregoing analysis has yielded a conclusion regarding when the
World Bank may lawfully take a nation's human rights record into account
in making its credit decisions. First, the bank must determine whether the
particular human rights violations it wishes to consider amount to an "eco-
nomic concern" under the IBRD and IDA Articles of Agreement. That con-
dition is safely met whenever such violations would, in the eyes of a
reasonable lender in the Bank's position, adversely affect the prospective
borrower's ability to meet its obligations to the Bank under the credit
agreement.24
0
Once a nation's human rights policy is established as a valid "eco-
nomic consideration," the second step commences: determining whether
consideration of the policy will breach the "political activity" prohibition of
the IBRD or IDA Charter.241 Reference to relevant rules of international
law has shown that the consideration of human rights will not represent an
intrusion into a nation's "political affairs" if the abuses relate to "funda-
mental human rights," which include, inter alia, the rights set forth in the
International Bill of Rights. 242 Finally, analysis of the Articles' travaux
preparatoires has demonstrated that the Bank does not indulge in imper-
missible consideration of a nation's "political character" by evaluating a
prospective borrower's violations of fundamental human rights.243
This author offers the foregoing conclusions as an alternative to the
current Bank position and encourages Ko-Yung Tung and the Executive
Directors of the World Bank to consider a revised interpretation of the
IBRD and IDA Articles of Agreement. Such interpretation would permit,
but not require, the Bank to broaden its existing scope of human rights
Id.
237. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. Both the IBRD and IDA Articles of
Agreement provide that, in the event of a dispute among member nations, the Executive
Directors (and, upon appeal, the Board of Governors) of the World Bank have the final
power to interpret the Charter provisions.
238. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. Historically, the General Counsel
of the World Bank has taken the lead in interpreting the IBRD and IDA Articles of Agree-
ment, and his legal opinions have been the most important factor weighed by the Bank's
Executive Directors in arriving at an interpretation. Therefore, the new General Counsel
of the World Bank, Mr. Ko-Yung Tung, is the individual to whom the arguments herein
are most specifically directed.
239. For a full discussion of the proper interpretive methodology to be applied by the
Bank in analyzing its constitutive Articles of Agreement, see supra Part I.
240. The rationale for this conclusion is set forth in Section II(A). See supra Part II.A.
241. See IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 16, art. IV, § 10; IDA Articles of
Agreement, supra note 17, art. V, § 6. Both the IBRD and IDA Articles of Agreement
contain political activity prohibitions, which are nearly identical.
242. See supra Part II.B.2.
243. See supra Part II.C.
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considerations. 244 Perhaps more importantly, the interpretation proposed
herein would largely abolish the confusing distinction between preponder-
antly "economic" or "political" human rights, thereby enhancing the Bank's
transparency, accountability, and ultimately its effectiveness and
reputation.
24 5
244. See, e.g., Bradlow, supra note 26; Cahn, supra note 3, 160-61; Handl, supra note
13, at 662-65; Moris, supra note 2, at 182-200; Orford, supra note 4, at 464-71. It is
important to emphasize that this article has limited its inquiry to the question of when
the World Bank may entertain human rights considerations as a matter of law. Only
when that question is answered does a separate, but easily confused issue remain: when
should the Bank exercise that power? The literature has often tangled these distinct
questions, frequently drawing upon one to answer the other; however, this article does
not attempt to address the latter question.
245. This two-step approach, in which the legal question is answered before the policy
question, would enhance the reputation and legitimacy of the World Bank among its
members by drawing a clearer line between law and policy. For a compatible argument,
see Bradlow, supra note 26, at 51 (stating that "the IFIs must develop an explicit human
rights policy .... A transparent and predictable human rights policy, provided it were
Well publicized, would also enable all interested parties to understand what they can
expect from the IFls when their activities have an effect on human rights").

